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Law, Ideology, and Industrial Discipline:




The case of the Philadelphia Cordwainers' in 1806 revolution-
ized the legal relations between labor and capital in the United
States. According to the theory of criminal conspiracy articulated in
the case, workers were prohibited from acting in concert to improve
their wages and working conditions, and such combinations were
deemed to be punishable at common law. That legal principle was
ostensibly modified in Commonwealth v. Hunt2 in 1842, but, in fact,
conspiracy prosecutions against workers were maintained success-
fully until the early decades of the twentieth century.
In two related aspects, the law was crucial to the evolving capi-
talistic method of production. First, it performed a coercive function
by imposing direct legal sanctions against workers who exercised
their collective economic strength against employers. Second, in its
broad social and cultural dimension, the law propounded an ideology
that explained and legitimated the capitalist organization of the la-
bor process and deflected any significant public support for the work-
ers' opposition to changing labor conditions. Without the legal envi-
ronment created by the various conspiracy prosecutions, the
capitalist program of industrial discipline could not have been con-
ducted effectively, and without discipline, the capitalist organization
of production could not have been effected under the historical con-
ditions of the early nineteenth century.
The nature of industrial discipline arises from the particular
characteristics of the labor bargain under capitalism. As Marx
pointed out, the purchase of labor involves a unique feature in that
* B.A. 1967, Fort Lewis College; Ph.D. 1972, University of Colorado; J.D. 1976, Uni-
versity of Colorado; Associate Professor of Labor Studies and Industrial Relations, The Penn-
sylvania State University; Member of the Colorado Bar.
I. Commonwealth v. Pullis (Mayor's Court Phila. 1806), in 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
OF AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY 59 (J. Commons & E. Gilmore ed. 1910) [hereinafter
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY].
2. 45 Mass. (4 Met.) III (1842).
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the transaction is not complete when the worker sells labor to the
capitalist; the capitalist actually possesses only potential labor power
and must realize its value through its expenditure by the worker.3
That process remains a fundamental issue in the capitalist organiza-
tion of production. One contemporary formulation, for example, pro-
vides as follows:
Here is a real peculiarity of labor-power. The enjoyment of
the use-value of any other commodity is nonproblematic: the
bread does not resist being eaten. Not so with labor-power. Its
"use value" is not delivered, it is not offered, it is not consumed.
It must be extracted. This process of extraction engages the en-
ergies of armies of supervisors, time-motion men, guards, spies,
and bosses of all descriptions."
The labor process, whereby labor power is extracted and surplus
value is created for appropriation, hinges on the capitalist's ability to
control workers at the point of production.5 Discipline, which must
3. One consequence of the particular nature of labor-power as a commodity, Marx said,
is that:
its use-value does not, on the conclusion of the contract between the buyer
and seller, immediately pass into the hands of the former. Its value, like that of
every other commodity, is already fixed before it goes into circulation, since a
definite quantity of social labour has been spent upon it; but its use-value con-
sists in the subsequent exercise of its force. The alienation of labour-power and
its actual appropriation by the buyer, its employment as a use-value, are sepa-
rated by an interval of time.
I K. MARX, CAPITAL: A CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 174 (F. Engels ed.; S. Moore & E.
Aveling trans. 1965). The concept of "use-value" and its relation to labor is analyzed in G.
PILLING, MARX'S CAPITAL: PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICAL ECONOMY 41-56 (1980). Pilling em-
phasizes that Marx's categories derive from an analysis of social conditions rather than from
the abstract theories of "value" prevalent among Classical economists. For Marx, the ex-
change of commodities, including money, was embedded in social relations. Pilling explains as
follows:
Marx showed that value is nothing else but the embodiment of human la-
bour in the abstract, the quantity of which is measured by socially necessary
working time. It became possible to get to the essence of value, to define this
concept adequately only in the conditions of capitalist production, where the
equality and equivalence of all forms of labour was revealed, when the predomi-
nant social relationship between people became their relationship as commodity
owners, when the producers were finally separated from the means of production
and labour power itself became a commodity.
Id. at 16. The "labor theory of value" espoused by working-class radicals in the early eight-
eenth century was based on the notion that labor created all wealth in society. That wealth,
however, was appropriated by the rich and powerful, who produced nothing. See generally E.
PESSEN, MOST UNCOMMON JACKSONIANS: THE RADICAL LEADERS OF THE EARLY LABOR
MOVEMENT (1967).
4. Gintis & Bowles, Structure and Practice in the Labor Theory of Value, REV. OF
RADICAL POL. ECON., Winter 1981, at 1, 14 (1981).
5. Marx describes two "characteristic phenomena" associated with the consumption of
labor power. "First, the labourer works under the control of the capitalist to whom his labour
belongs. ... Second, "the product is the property of the capitalist and not that of the
labourer, its immediate producer." The aim of the capitalist is "to produce a commodity whose
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be ultimately enforced through the penalty of discharge, is the pri-
mary means of control. The only effective response by workers is
group resistance, because the capitalist cannot feasibly discharge the
entire work force. For the capitalist, it consequently becomes imper-
ative "to stratify the workforce in order to minimize worker solidar-
ity" and that may be accomplished by "[tiurning the division of la-
bor into a hierarchy of diverse and antagonistic fragments."' In the
modern industrial setting, for instance, racism and sexism are com-
mon devices by which capitalists can dissipate the perceived com-
monality of interest within a work group and reduce the bargaining
power of all workers as a class.
7
Viewed in its relation to the emerging factory system, the con-
spiracy doctrine was ideally suited to the aim of destroying working
class solidarity. Instrumentally, it outlawed organized worker resis-
tance to the intensification and exploitation of labor. Simultaneously,
the doctrine was articulated in a manner that eroded class identity
and interest. Through an examination of the social and economic
context in which the legal rule was developed and perpetuated, it
becomes evident that the common law of conspiracy was a vital ele-
ment in the industrial order of the nineteenth century.
II. The Social Origin of Workplace Discipline
The first major phase of economic development in this country
extended from the early nineteenth century into the decade of the
1890's. During that period, which Edwards, Reich, and Gordon
characterize as the stage of "initial proletarianization," the Ameri-
can economy evolved from a largely agricultural basis to an indus-
trial one, and the predominant form of economic activity became
wage labor.8 The process, despite its concrete historical complexity,
was essentially "uniformly simple." The groups comprising the pre-
capitalist working population were "emancipated" from their liveli-
value shall be greater than the sum of the values of the commodities used in its production,
that is, of the means of production and the labour-power, that he purchased with his good
money in the open market." K. MARX, supra note 3, at 184-86.
6. Gintis & Bowles, supra note 4, at 15.
7. The proposition is empirically demonstrated in M. REICH. RACIAL INEQUALITY: A
POLITICAL-ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1981). Reich contends that capitalist employers are con-
cerned with profitability rather than efficiency and that "[w]orker solidarity tends to retard
productivity while advancing wage pressures on capitalists." Therefore, "[h]iring, pay, and
promotion policies that reduce and limit worker solidarity serve the interests of individual capi-
talists and persist in both perfectly competitive and monopsonistically competitive markets."
Id. at 202.
8. D. GORDON, R. EDWARDS & M. REICH. SEGMENTED WORK, DIVIDED WORKERS: THE
HISTORICAL TRANSFORMATION OF LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES 48-99 (1982).
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hood; "[t]hose who became wage workers had first been stripped of
their means of production-freed or deprived, that is, of all alternate
ways of supporting themselves. They were driven to wage labor."9
Despite technological innovation during the period, the preva-
lence of wage labor within the factory setting did not arise as a con-
sequence of changes in the technological basis of the labor process
itself. Methods of production remained unaltered for a significant
time after the reorganization of labor power, and "[t]he persistence
of traditional techniques within the capitalist sector, even within
those large works employing a substantial labor force, could be seen
in diverse industries."'" As Stephen Marglin concluded in an influen-
tial essay, the rise of the factory system cannot be explained as a
technological imperative, for most new methods of production, such
as the spinning-jenny, might have been incorporated into the "put-
ting-out" system of independent producers." The basis of the factory
system was rather an intensified supervision of workers. Marglin ob-
serves as follows: "The key to the success of the factory, as well as
its aspiration, was the substitution of capitalists' for workers' control
of the production process; discipline and supervision could and did
reduce costs without being technologically superior. "12 Thus, the
benefit accruing from the factory organization was not one of eco-
nomic "efficiency." There was instead "a larger output in return for
a greater input of labor, not more output for the same input."'
3
Referring to the writings of Andrew Ure, an eighteenth-century
author, Marglin demonstrates that contemporary observers of indus-
trialization understood quite clearly that the true advantage of the
factory system lay with its superior organization of the labor process
and not with technological development. Ure, to illustrate, regarded
Richard Arkwright as the exemplary British factory owner, and in
his Philosophy of Manufacturers, Ure particularly credits Ark-
wright for introducing and maintaining a system of labor organiza-
tion rather than for creating a mechanism for the production of cot-
9. Id. at 56.
10. Id. at 85.
1I. Marglin, What Do Bosses Do? The Origins and Functions of Hierarchy in Capital-
ist Production, REV. OF RADICAL POL. ECON., Summer 1974, at 33; see also D. CLAWSON,
BUREAUCRACY AND THE LABOR PROCESS: THE TRANSFORMATION OF U.S. INDUSTRY, 1860-
1920 36-70 (1980) (describing the organizational changes in the labor process that were prior
to, and a condition of, technological advances); D. NOBLE, FORCES OF PRODUCTION: A SOCIAL
HISTORY OF INDUSTRIAL AUTOMATION (1984) (tracing the development of numerical control
technology after World War II and arguing that technological change was not based on supe-
rior efficiency but on considerations of class domination).
12. Marglin, supra note 11, at 46 (emphasis in original).
13. Id. at 51.
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ton thread. Ure wrote as follows:
The main difficulty did not, to my apprehension, lie so
much in the invention of a self-acting mechanism for drawing
out and twisting cotton into a continuous thread, as in the distri-
bution of the different members of the apparatus into one co-
operative body, in impelling each organ with its appropriate del-
icacy and speed, and, above all, in training human beings to re-
nounce their desultory habits of work, and to identify themselves
with the unvarying regularity of the complex automaton.1
4
Ure thus focuses on the organizational aspects of Arkwright's enter-
prise, and he emphasizes that factory discipline was intended to
modify workers' consciousness with regard to the labor process by
forcing them "to identify themselves with the unvarying regularity of
the complex automaton." Ure concludes that the imposition of a new
relation of production was Arkwright's most significant contribution
to the factory system: "To devise and administer a successful code of
factory discipline, suited to the necessities of factory diligence, was
the Herculean enterprise, the novel achievement of Arkwright." 15
Other capitalists of the period, such as Josiah Wedgwood, un-
dertook similar cultivation of the working class. In Wedgwood's
view, it was essential that factory labor be trained for both the ac-
tual requirements of the task and habituated to the factory environ-
ment as well. The demands of factory work, however, ran counter to
the cultural attitudes of the community, and there was substantial
resistance to Wedgwood's efforts. One historian notes that "[t]he
potters had enjoyed their independence too long to take kindly to the
rules which Wedgwood attempted to enforce-the punctuality, the
constant attendance, the fixed hours, the scrupulous standards of
care and cleanliness, the avoidance of waste, the ban on drinking.
They did not surrender easily." '16
Particularly critical to employers was the matter of punctual at-
tendance, and time began to assume an increasingly important role
in the cultural conflict. Wedgwood distinguished himself by intro-
ducing the bell to signal the beginning of the working day, which
commenced "'l/ of an hour before (the men) can see to work,' "17
and he refined the system of attendance with a form of time cards
through which absenteeism could be carefully monitored. Among his
14. A. URE, PHILOSOPHY OF MANUFACTURERS, OR AN EXPOSITION OF THlE SCIENTIFIC,
MORAL AND COMMERCIAL ECONOMY OF THE FACTORY SYSTEM OF GREAT BRITAIN 15 (1835).
15. Id.
16. McKendrick, Josiah Wedgwood and Factory Discipline, 4 HIST. J. 30, 38 (1961).
17. Id. at 41 (quoting Wedgwood's manuscripts).
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contemporaries, Wedgwood's ideas "to encourage punctuality and
prevent loss of working time seem to be without equal." 18 Moreover,
the environment in Wedgwood's factories was not an "indulgent"
one; contrary to their traditions, laborers were forced to work at
fixed hours on a regular basis. "The cherished St. Monday was to be
unfrocked, and all the gods of idleness and mindless enjoyment simi-
larly banished. Time was the new idol-together with care, regular-
ity and obedience."' 9
In his analysis of time and discipline in the emerging factory
system, the British historian E.P. Thompson contrasts industrialized
time with work in precapitalist societies.2 0 The latter, Thompson ob-
serves, reveal an orientation toward labor that is appropriately de-
scribed as a "task-orientation" possessing three important features.
First, task orientation is a relatively comprehensible form of activity,
based as it is on an "observed necessity." Second, in task-oriented
societies, there is less emphasis on the distinction between "work"
and other relationships: "Social intercourse and labour are intermin-
gled - the working-day lengthens or contracts according to the task
- and there is no great sense of conflict between labour and 'passing
the time of day'." Last, the task-oriented activity appears to time-
workers "to be wasteful and lacking in urgency."'2
To impose a new consciousness of work on factory labor, the
industrialists engaged in a broad campaign inside and outside the
factories. In the workplace, the new habits were forged by a variety
of means. Among them were "the division of labour; the supervision
of labour; bells and clocks; money incentives; preachings and school-
ings; the suppression of fairs and sports. 2 Simultaneously, the
awareness of "time-thrift" increasingly was transmitted through cul-
tural channels; as Thompson comments, "In early Victorian tracts
and reading-matter aimed at the masses one is choked by the quan-
tity of the stuff."1
23
The development of specific disciplinary strategies to inculcate
the appropriate consciousness in British workers was analyzed by
Sidney Pollard, a leading economic historian. In his study, Pollard
emphasizes that "one of the most critical, and one of the most diffi-
18. Id.
19. Id. at 51.
20. Thompson, Time, Work-Discipline, and Industrial Capitalism, 38 PAST AND PRE-
SENT 56 (1967).
21. Id. at 60.
22. Id. at 90.
23. Id.
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cult, transformations required in an industrializing society is the ad-
justment of labour to the regularity and discipline of factory
work." '24 Employers were confronted with a working population
which was "non-accumulative, non-acquisitive, accustomed to work
for subsistence, not for maximization of income"; the capitalist man-
date was to create a class "obedient to the cash stimulus, and obedi-
ent in such a way as to react precisely to the stimuli provided.
'25
According to Pollard, "Dismissal and the threat of dismissal,
were in fact the main deterrent instruments of enforcing discipline in
the factories." 2 6 Discharges, however, could only be effectively
threatened or undertaken when labor market conditions permitted.
Labor shortages reduced the employers' power; as Pollard notes,
"Many [employers] abolished the apprentice system in order to gain
it, and without it others were unable to keep any control whatso-
ever." 27 Similarly, in the case of skilled workers who could not be
replaced easily, discharge was a problematic form of discipline.
Concerning organized worker resistance to discipline, Pollard
observes that "[tihe law could usually be assumed to be at the ser-
vice of the employer" in defeating any concerted activity; in any
event, "[w]orkmen's combinations were widely treated as criminal
offences in employers' circles, even before the law made them explic-
itly such . . . "" Typically, employers reacted to organizing efforts
by workers by such steps as dismissal and blacklisting.
In general, Pollard concludes, the task of adjusting workers to
factory discipline was immense and unique. To that end, British cap-
italists "used not only industrial means but a whole battery of extra-
mural powers, including their control over the courts, their powers as
landlords, and their own ideology, to impose the control they re-
quired. 29 Workers' values were usually destroyed in the process.
Industrialization in the United States was characterized by con-
flicts of culture and values similar to those experienced by British
workers. Herbert Gutman, in his important analysis of work and cul-
ture in the United States a0 argues that the impact of industrializa-
tion resulted "from the fact that the American working class was
24. Pollard, Factory Discipline in the Industrial Revolution 16 ECON. HIST. REv. 254
(1963).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 261.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 262.
29. Id. at 270.
30. See Gutman, Work, Culture and Society in Industrializing America, 1815-1919, 78
AM. HIST. REV. 531 (1973).
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continually altered in its composition by infusions, from within and
without the nation, of peasants, farmers, skilled artisans, and casual
day laborers who brought into industrial society ways of work and
other habits and values not associated with industrial necessities and
the industrial ethos."'" In fact, he concludes, the persistent influx of
new groups into the American working class generated throughout
the period 1815-1920 a recurrent pattern of collective behavior "usu-
ally only associated with the early phases of industrialization. 3 2 Ac-
cordingly, the dissolution and reconstitution of social values associ-
ated with industrial development was a continuous process in this
country during the nineteenth century.
An excellent illustration of the cultural transformation, which
also serves to locate the earliest conspiracy prosecutions in their so-
cial context, is found in Paul Faler's study of the shoemakers of
Lynn, Massachusetts.38 Tracing the formation of class consciousness
in that community, Faler begins from the premise that class is a
function of a particular relation to the means of production, and
"class consciousness" is the articulation of class experience "in ideas,
traditions, folklore, and institutions." 4 The origin of a class relation-
ship between labor and capital in the shoe making industry was an
alteration in the organization of production; specifically, it involved
"the physical separation of journeymen from employer at the work
place." 35 The fundamental difference between capital and labor, at
that time, was that the master no longer participated in the produc-
tion of shoes, but became a shoe manufacturer. Although the separa-
tion commenced with the removal of the employer from the location
where shoes were made, the journeymen and employers continued
for a time to share certain cultural traditions. Eventually, however,
the presence of large manufacturers led to "an agitation among the
shoemakers that grew in extent and intensity in each decade between
1830 and 1860.' '"6
31. Id. at 541.
32. Id. at 543.
33. P. FALER, MECHANICS AND MANUFACTURES IN THE EARLY INDUSTRIAL REVOLU-
TION: LYNN, MASSACHUSETTS, 1780-1860 (1981). Lynn is also the subject of another book-
length study. See A. DAWLEY, CLASS AND COMMUNITY: THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION IN
LYNN (1976). Faler's work, however, is the more elaborate and penetrating examination of the
evolving social consciousness within the community under emergent capitalism. For a concise
overview of the theme of culture and industrialization in recent scholarship, see Cantor, Intro-
duction to AMERICAN WORKINGCLASS CULTURE: EXPLORATIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR AND
SOCIAL HISTORY 3-30 (M. Cantor ed. 1979).
34. P. FALER, supra note 33, at 165.
35. Id. at 166.
36. Id. at 168; see also Commons, Introduction to 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra
note 1, at 19-58. Commons' description of the transformation in the shoemaking industry is
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The complaints of the Lynn shoemakers against the "bosses"
and "grinders" assumed a form common to working class radicalism
in this country. As economic conditions deteriorated during the pe-
riod, relations between worker and employer worsened. Among their
strategies of exploitation, manufacturers introduced the practice of
paying wages in the form of drafts against the capitalist's store,
which were discounted as much as twenty-five to thirty-five per-
cent.37 In addition, the decline in real wages between 1830 and 1860
forced workers to produce more shoes, usually of lower quality, to
maintain their income. The availability of a reserve labor market of
"outworkers" in the region surrounding Lynn also figured in the
power of employers, who used the competition between the two
groups to resist wage demands by either.38
In his analysis of the working class reaction to the evolving dep-
redations of capitalism, Faler concludes that the crucial philosophi-
cal basis was the labor theory of value, which became "the cardinal
tenet in the mechanic ideology of both journeymen and masters who
formed the bulk of the town's population."3 9 Basically, the labor the-
ory of value he.ld that all wealth was created by the productive activ-
ity of workers.4 0 The most radical extension of the principle led to
the belief that labor was entitled to all the wealth flowing from pro-
ductive work; the class of nonproducers, such as lawyers, bankers,
and merchants, wrongly appropriated the benefits of labor. The
growing disparity between the economic conditions of workers and
the rising class of capitalists exacerbated the philosophical antago-
nism expressed by workers.
The language in which the emerging class conflict was cast
came largely from two sources: the cultural connotations associated
with the term "mechanic" and the idiom of the American Revolu-
tion. "Mechanics" or workers were asserted to be the producers of
wealth within the community, and they claimed respect and status
on an equivalent footing with other citizens. 4" Their resistance to ex-
the classic work on the subject. Commons concluded that expanding markets led to the reor-
ganization of the relations of production; technology within the industry remained largely un-
changed until the Civil War.
37. P. FALER, supra note 33, at 170.
38. Id. at 174.
39. Id. at 176.
40. For contemporary discussions of the point, see B. LAURIE, WORKING PEOPLE OF
PHILADELPHIA, 1800-1850 75-83 (1980); E. PESSEN, supra note 3; Gintis & Bowles, supra note
4.
41. According to the mechanic ideology,
[t]he social structure should reflect the hierarchy of human needs, giving
first rank to the producers and relegating the parasitic non-producers to the bot-
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ploitation and oppression by the capitalist was analogous in their
view to the struggle against British tyranny; just as mechanics
played a central role in the war of independence, so they continued
to proclaim notions of equality and independence within the commu-
nity.4 2 Gradually, with the increasing estrangement of master and
journeyman, the two strands of social thought became indistinguish-
able; in Faler's words, "Here was the point at which the labor theory
of value and the heritage of the revolution merged, leading [workers]
to comprehend the system they confronted: its source of power and
powerlessness, of wealth and poverty, of rulers and ruled."48
To summarize, the factory system from its inception required
discipline as a means of control over workers. Innovations in technol-
ogy did not lead to the creation of factories; factories arose in con-
junction with new forms of organizing the processes of production,
and the developing technology further enabled capitalists to enhance
their control within the factory." The need for a sustained and per-
manent disciplinary program was itself a revolutionary element
within the evolving capitalist environment, and it necessitated social
change that had a profound impact on the cultural traditions of
workers. Workers sought to preserve their culture, among other
means, by articulating a vision of themselves as productive citizens
tom of society. Power, position and prestige should go to those groups that were
essential for the maintenance of human life. Highest rank would go to men of
talent and ability who stood at the top of the trade in which they worked.
P. FALER, supra note 33, at 31.
42.
[Wjhen Federalist personalities were condemned as aristocrats, they were
pilloried for an outlook that placed mechanics as men of inferior political capa-
bilities, whose duty it was to adhere to the decision of their social betters. This
attitude, and the word "aristocrat" itself, was also directly associated with the
meaning of the Revolution. Many tradesmen identified the Federalists, who gen-
erally defended the British cause in the diplomatic quarrels of the day, with the
hated British enemy of '76. With wartime antagonisms still very much alive, this
connection proved most effective.
H. ROCK, ARTISANS OF THE NEW REPUBLIC: THE TRADESMEN OF NEW YORK CITY IN THE
AGE OF JEFFERSON 57 (1979).
43. P. FALER, supra note 33, at 188.
44. Clawson observes as follows:
In this transition [from handicraft to manufacture], workers are gathered
together into large groups under the discipline and control of a capitalist. Even
though no new tools or machines are introduced, capitalists achieve all the bene-
fits which are described by the social control theory (control over work hours,
embezzlement, and work rhythms). The point of Marx's analysis is that this
organizational change precedes, both historically and analytically, the techno-
logical revolution which is the foundation of modern industry. The transition to
manufacture is a social, not a technical change. To understand why it took place
we should look not to technology but to the material interest of the emerging
capitalist class.
D. CLAWSON, supra note 11, at 57 (emphasis in original).
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within the community. Consistent with the labor theory of value,
they demanded an adequate wage and recognition of their social
contribution. In opposing the encroachments of capitalism, they fre-
quently relied on the ideals and idiom of the Revolutionary War.
The law, at once a repository of institutionalized force and of
communal ideology, was the keystone of dynamic capitalism. The
criminal penalties assessed against workers under the conspiracy
doctrine were usually minimal, but the ideological impact of the le-
gal proceedings was profound. Essentially, the terms of the legal dis-
course were merged with the terms of the social and political dis-
course. As workers sought through concerted work action to
maintain their standing within the community, the conspiracy prose-
cutions institutionalized the class conflict manifested in the struggles
occurring in the workplace. Through the judicial system, workers'
social aspirations were degraded and deradicalized. Notions of
equality, community, and class acquired capitalist connotations,
rather than the meanings contended for by workers, and legal doc-
trine, with the one apparent exception of Hunt, functioned as a
transparent device for administering power in the interests of
capitalism.
III. Ideology, Discourse, and Class Conflict
In any consideration of the conspiracy doctrine from a perspec-
tive of class interest, the decision in Commonwealth v. Hunt" must
be regarded as problematic.46 Chief Justice Shaw's opinion is typi-
cally regarded as a modification of the doctrine tending to the ad-
vantage of the working class and contrary to the interests of the cap-
italist class, of which Shaw was a member.47 In the most recent
treatment of the conspiracy cases, for example, Wythe Holt explains
Hunt within a framework of class conflict.48 According to Holt's in-
45. 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 111 (1842).
46. See, e.g., M. TURNER. THE EARLY AMERICAN LABOR CONSPIRACY CASES: THEIR
PLACE IN LABOR LAW - A REINTERPRETATION 58 (1967) (examining the "persistent myth
that Commonwealth v. Hunt holds a unique place in legal history"). Other major treatments
of the conspiracy doctrine include the following: J. LANDIS, CASES ON LABOR LAW 33-38 (2d
ed. 1942); L. LEVY, THE LAW OF THE COMMONWEALTH AND CHIEF JUSTICE SHAW 183-206
(1957); Holt, Labour Conspiracy Cases in the United States, 1805-1842: Bias and Legitima-
tion in Common Law Adjudication, 22 OScOODE HALL L.J. 591 (1984); Morris, Criminal
Conspiracy and Early Labor Combinations in New York, 52 POL. Sci. Q. 51 (1937); Nelles,
Commonwealth v. Hunt, 32 COLUMBIA L. REV. 1128 (1932); Nelles, The First American La-
bor Case, 41 YALE L.J. 165 (1931); Sayre, Criminal Conspiracy, 35 HARV. L. REV. 393
(1922); Witte, Early American Labor Cases, 35 YALE L.J. 825 (1926).
47. See, e.g. Nelles, Commonwealth v. Hunt, supra note 46, at 1151-52.
48. See Holt, supra note 46.
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terpretation, Hunt can best be viewed as an instance of judicial legit-
imation. The opinion, he contends, was sufficiently ambiguous that it
was interpreted as a victory for workers and yet was subsequently
relied on by the prosecution in later conspiracy proceedings. Hunt
was thus ideological in nature and attempted to legitimate the com-
mon law by conveying a semblance of neutrality and fairness.49 De-
spite its rigorous legal analysis, however, Holt's account does not sig-
nificantly advance the analysis of earlier scholars. Those scholars
also propounded the notion that Shaw decided the case on grounds
extraneous to the litigation for the purpose of debilitating certain
political movements antithetical to his class interests.8 0 Thus, to
comprehend the historical importance of Hunt, it is necessary to ex-
amine the ideological consequence of legal thought in a specific eco-
nomic context.51
The Marxian theory of law as an instrument of class oppression
can be utilized to explain the seeming inconsistencies in the evolution
of the conspiracy doctrine. In the early conspiracy cases, the legal
rules had an obvious instrumental link to the interests of the domi-
nant economic class; that is, the rules openly furthered the economic
power of employers. Those rules were not simplistically derived from
the existence of an overt ruling class conspiracy. More appropriately,
they originated from the material environment that characterized
the emerging factory system. That environment influenced the forms
of consciousness underlying the development of law. The point is
made succinctly by Hugh Collins: "Since the class of owners of the
means of production share similar experiences and perform approxi-
mately the same role in the relations of production, there emerges a
dominant ideology which permeates their perceptions of interest.
'5 2
Legal rules are formulated consistent with that ideological back-
49. Holt argues as follows:
I do not say that Shaw intended to fool the world, but I do say that the
structures of liberal thought and common law judicial decision-making are such
that they allow the intelligent ideologue to express an apparent concession in a
manner which actually negates that concession and, in the end, keeps the ideo-
logue's deep economic interest intact, all entirely "unconsciously."
Holt, supra note 46, at 645 n. 267.
50. See, e.g., L. LEVY, supra note 46, at 200-06 (codification movement); Nelles, Com-
monwealth v. Hunt, supra note 46, at I 159 (tariff legislation). The specific interpretations are
discussed infra text accompanying notes 162-190.
51. Holt's study contains a concise summary of the social and economic conditions sur-
rounding the conspiracy doctrine. See Holt, supra note 46, at 605-12. The focus of this article,
however, is on the control and discipline of workers in a capitalist system through the ideology
of law. That particularized approach leads to significantly different emphases and conclusions
from those reached by Holt.
52. H. COLLINS, MARXISM AND LAW 43 (1982).
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ground, and eventually such rules are accepted as the normal and
appropriate social order.
Occasionally, however, judicial decisions such as Common-
wealth v. Hunt may inure to the evident benefit of the working class,
a phenomenon logically incompatible with a reductionist version of
the class conflict interpretation of law. Marxian theory explains such
occurrences through the device of legal "autonomy." Superficially,
the legal system guarantees neutrality and equality of access to all
citizens. At the same time, however, "the appearance of autonomy
conceals deep structural constraints upon the powers of the State ap-
paratus which ensure that it faithfully pursues the interests of the
ruling class."5 3 Because its values permeate the social background of
everyday life, the dominant class can create a cultural hegemony
that conditions social existence. In this respect, the legal system
plays a "vital role":
In particular the legal framework of rules and doctrines
provides a comprehensive interpretation and evaluation of social
relationships and events which is in tune with the main themes
in the dominant ideology. Because the legal system is encoun-
tered frequently in daily life, its systematic articulation and dis-
semination of a dominant ideology are some of the chief mecha-
nisms for the establishment of ideological hegemony. 4
Accordingly, law functions as a vehicle not only for the application
of state-sanctioned force, but also for the transmission of attitudes,
beliefs, and values.
By analogy, legal reasoning also can be accommodated to a the-
ory of historical materialism. According to the Marxian tenet that
"social being determines consciousness," the intellectual processes
that produce a judicial decision must be viewed against the back-
ground of the dominant ideology of the capitalist class. 5 The techni-
cal features of legal reasoning, such as internal consistency and co-
herence, give the appearance of a discrete and autonomous system,
but that seeming autonomy is constrained by existing principle and
precedent that limits the range of available discourse in a given case.
Moreover, the appearance of autonomy contributes to the acceptance
of the Rule of Law as a source of legitimate authority in our society.
Without a belief that "officials of the legal system can apply legal
rules impartially through judicial logic without resort to considera-
53. Id. at 49.
54. Id. at 50.
55. Id. at 70-71.
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tions of social justice or personal gain, then the Rule of Law ideal
will wear thin."5 s Stated differently,
[i]f the law is evidently partial and unjust, then it will mask
nothing, legitimize nothing, contribute nothing to any class's he-
gemony. The essential precondition for the effectiveness of law,
in its function as ideology, is that it shall display an indepen-
dence from gross manipulation and shall seem to be just."
Thus, law derives from the social relations of production and has an
ideological dimension that reinforces patterns of class conflict. It ac-
cordingly follows that the language of law will manifest an ideologi-
cal content in its particularized usages. 8
A recent attempt by John Thompson to formulate a theory of
ideology depends on a "critical" conception of ideology, which sup-
poses that "ideology is essentially linked to the process of sustaining
asymmetrical relations of power - that is, to the process of main-
taining domination." 59 Thompson argues that the relation between
language and ideology can be explored through an analysis of dis-
course, or the actual usages of language in a spoken or written form
in a concrete social setting. The insights developed in Thompson's
sketch of a methodology of interpretation can be applied to the dis-
course of the conspiracy cases.
Critique, Thompson argues, properly addresses at least three
functional properties of ideology. First, ideology acts to legitimate a
relation of domination, for its objective is the preservation and en-
hancement of social power. Second, it operates through dissimula-
tion, in that it furthers the interests of one group while simultane-
ously and ostensibly furthering the interests of another. Third,
ideology reifies a given condition or state of affairs by representing it
as a historical and inevitable fact.60 Thompson emphasizes that the
analysis of ideology necessarily involves a "social-historical context"
that focuses on "particular agents at particular times in particular
56. Id. at 136.
57. E. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS: THE ORIGIN OF THE BLACK ACT 263 (1977).
58. There is substantial contemporary debate regarding Marxism, law, and ideology. See
generally Hunt, The Ideology of Law: Advances and Problems in Recent Applications of the
Concept of Ideology to the Analysis of Law, 19 LAW & SoC'Y REV. 11 (1985); Stone, The
Place of Law in the Marxian Structure-Superstructure Archetype, 19 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 39
(1985). The relationship of Marxist thought to the important new movement in legal scholar-
ship known as Critical Legal Studies is problematic. For an excellent discussion of that point,
see Boyle, The Politics of Reason: Critical Legal Theory and Local Social Thought, 133 U.
PA. L. REV. 685 (1985).
59. J. THOMPSON, STUDIES IN THE THEORY OF IDEOLOGY 4 (1984).
60. Id. at 131.
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settings" and an institutional context that examines "the loci of
power and the crystallization of relations of domination."61
The conspiracy cases offer a compelling illustration of ideology
manifested through the formulation and application of common law.
Relations of power lay at the heart of the conspiracy prosecutions.
The "social-historical" context is embedded in the testimony of the
witnesses, the argument of counsel, and the instructions of the
judges. In institutional terms, the common law action was an ideal
process for the clash of antagonistic economic interests; the outcome
of the trial conferred some superior legal right on one party, such as
the right of employers to deal with workers on an individual rather
than a group basis. In addition, it is significant to note that operative
strategies of legitimation, dissimulation, and reification serve an im-
portant role in the major cases.
Between 1805 and 1842, workers were prosecuted under the
conspiracy doctrine on some nineteen occasions. 62 In the decade fol-
lowing Hunt, there were no reported cases; by the time of State v.
Donaldson63 in 1867, however, the doctrine had been resurrected in
its previous vitality and continued in force until the end of the cen-
tury.64 During the formative phases of the doctrine, exemplified by
the cases of the Philadelphia Cordwainers5 in 1806, the New York
Cordwainers6" in 1810, and the Pittsburgh Cordwainers6 7 in 1815,
there is a recurrent idiomatic motif evident in the legal discourse -
that motif is the accretion of meaning around the term "commu-
nity." Hunt, in sharp contrast, presents a new mode of discourse re-
flecting both an important shift in economic conditions and the
movement in legal consciousness from instrumentalism to
61. Id. at 135.
62. For a list of cases, see M. TURNER, supra note 46, at 2 (Table I); Holt, supra note
46, at 662 (Table 1). Commonwealth ex rel Chew v. Carlisle, I Brightly Nisi Prius 36 (Pa.
1821) involved a suit against masters. Another case not referred to by Turner nor reported in
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY is mentioned in Holt, supra note 46, at 592 n. 2.; it occurred in 1842
in Rockdale, Pennsylvania, and is described in A. WALLACE, ROCKDALE: THE GROWTH OF AN
AMERICAN VILLAGE IN THE EARLY INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 359-65 (1978). The defendants
in the case struck in response to a cut in piece rates and were found guilty of conspiracy.
63. 32 N.J.L 151 (1867).
64. "[Mlore conspiracy cases can be found to have followed Commonwealth v. Hunt
than to have preceded it." M. TURNER, supra note 46, at 59.
65. Commonwealth v. Pullis (Mayor's Court Phila. 1806), in 3 DOCUMENTARY HIS-
TORY, supra note 1, at 59 (discussed infra notes 69-104 and accompanying text).
66. People v. Melvin, 2 Wheeler 262 (1810), in 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note
1, at 251 (discussed infra notes 105-124 and accompanying text).
67. Commonwealth v. Morrow (Court of Quarter Sess. Allegheny Cty. 1815), in 4 DOC-
UMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 15 (discussed infra notes 125-133 and accompanying
text).
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"formalism." 8
Implicit in the arguments centering on "community" were cru-
cial notions of class difference. The emergent ideology of capitalism
at once recognized the existence of a working class, but denied that
the members of the class had common interests either with one an-
other or with other citizens of the community. Simultaneously, then,
the prosecution portrayed a class - workers who might rise up in
combinations against their masters - and fractured its bonds of sol-
idarity by depicting the attendant injury to individual workers and
the larger society. Within the orbit of the notion of communal well-
being gravitated the major derivative associations implicated in the
ideological contest, including the terms "equality," "independence,"
"liberty," "freedom," and the "spirit of the Revolution."
IV. Conspiracy Doctrine Prior to Hunt
A. Philadelphia Cordwainers
The indictments in the landmark Philadelphia Cordwainers
case69 were drawn on the basis of English common law precedent.
For that reason, one method of analyzing the conspiracy doctrine
focuses on the narrow issue of the content of that precedent. Caesar
Rodney and Walter Franklin, acting for the defense in Philadelphia
Cordwainers, argued that the definition of conspiracy propounded by
the prosecution and set forth in the indictments was not, in fact, a
sufficiently accurate statement of English law to support a convic-
tion. The exploration of that question encompasses the substantive
and strictly legal content of the conspiracy doctrine.
A second approach to the conspiracy theory involves the under-
lying political economy of the doctrine. That approach considers
whether, assuming English precedent was as stated by the prosecu-
tion, it should be applied in any event against American workers.
The arguments on this issue, framed as an inquiry into public policy,
give rise to the more general debate concerning the role of labor and
capital in the community.
Analysis of the first question reveals a significant point, which is
that the legal core of the conspiracy doctrine was never a neutral,
objective principle susceptible of definitive articulation. The idealized
68. The evolution of American legal thought during this period is described in M. HoR-
WITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 (1977).
69. Commonwealth v. Pullis (Mayor's Court Phila. 1806), in 3 DOCUMENTARY HIs-
TORY, supra note I, at 59.
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features of the rule of law - clarity, coherence, and determinacy"0
- were conspicuously lacking from the conspiracy doctrine. On at
least two occasions prior to Hunt, a principle identical to that
adopted by Shaw had been the basis of decision by judges.7' Further,
most legal scholars are agreed that the common law rule in the Phil-
adelphia Cordwainers case was not, in fact, the common law rule in
England, but was based on English statutory law.72 Thus, the doc-
trine could hardly have been the product of autonomous legal rea-
soning grounded on adherence to precedent, internal consistency, and
neutral principle. From its inception to its eventual withering away,
the "law" regulating labor conspiracies was indeterminate, mallea-
ble, and unpredictable. It was particularized by judges to attain a
given result in each case.
The indictment in Philadelphia Cordwainers consisted of three
counts. It alleged generally that the defendants conspired together
"to increase and augment the prices and rates usually paid and al-
lowed to them and other artificers, workmen, and journeymen, in the
said art, and occupation, and unjustly to exact and procure great
sums of money, for their work and labour . . . . 7 The defendants
were also alleged to have prevented "by threat, menaces, and other
unlawful means," other journeymen from working "but at certain
large prices, and rates which they . . . then and there fixed and in-
sisted on being paid . . . . 4 Finally, the defendants allegedly
formed a club or society and conspired that none of them would
work for a master who employed a worker who was not a member of
the society or who infringed any of the society's rules. The prosecu-
70. See generally Kairys, Introduction to THE POLITICS OF LAW 1-7 (D. Kairys ed.
1982). Kairys describes the idealized view of law as
a decision-making process in which (1) the law on a particular issue is pre-
existing, clear, predictable, and available to anyone with reasonable legal skill;
(2) the facts relevant to disposition of a case are ascertained by objective hearing
and evidentiary rules that reasonably ensure that the truth will emerge; (3) the
result in a particular case is determined by a rather routine application of the
law to the facts; and (4) except for the occasional bad judge, any reasonably
competent and fair judge will reach the "correct" decision.
Id. at 1-2.
71. See infra text accompanying notes 134-46.
72. See, e.g., Holt, supra note 46, at 602-05. Workers contended that
apart from the statutes and the prosecutions founded upon them, the com-
mon law of England had never made a conspiracy of workers to raise wages a
criminal offense. They argued that every reported English case which antedated
1776 (except one) and which held labourers to the doctrine of conspiracy had
either been founded upon a statute or blindly followed the aberrational case.
Id. at 602-03.
73. 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 62.
74. Id. at 64-65.
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tion conceded that it was not unlawful for a worker to refuse to work
for less wages than he desired, or, as Joseph Hopkinson for the pros-
ecution explained, "The defendants are not indicted for regulating
their own individual wages, but for undertaking by a combination, to
regulate the price of the labour of others as well as their own.""
Stated most narrowly, then, the crime charged against the defend-
ants was that they had engaged in a conspiracy to achieve an end
they might lawfully have undertaken as individuals to achieve.
The English authority on that precise point was exhaustively re-
viewed by the respective counsel in the case. Prosecutor Hopkinson
asserted that "the mere combination to raise wages is considered an
offence at common law . . . .All combinations to regulate the price
of commodities is against the law."176 To support that proposition, he
primarily relied on the case of the journeymen tailors of Cambridge,
as reported in volume eight of Modern Cases in Law and Equity (8
Mod.), as holding that "[a] conspiracy is unlawful, even though the
matter might have been lawful, if done by them individually.
77
Arguing for the defense, Rodney first attacked the accuracy of
the report in 8 Mod. That work, he noted, had been condemned by
English authorities as a "miserable bad book," and was treated
"with the contempt it deserves. '7 8 Consequently, he concluded, the
theory that lawful acts could be rendered unlawful by conspiracy
was suspect.
Moreover, Rodney contended, there was an important distinc-
tion between the circumstances of the Philadelphia cordwainers and
the Cambridge tailors. The wages of the tailors were fixed by stat-
ute, and the conspiracy necessarily had as its object the contraven-
tion of a positive law. Even though the indictment in the case of the
Cambridge tailors did not specify that the defendants acted contrary
to statute ("contra formam statuti"), the existence of the statute was
nevertheless dispositive of the result. Rodney explained as follows:
75. Id. at 68. Hopkinson also observed that there was some misconception concerning
the purpose of the action. It was not commenced from "any private pique, or personal resent-
ment, but solely, with a view, to promote the common good of the community: and to prevent
in future the pernicious combinations, of misguided men, to effect purposes not only injurious
to themselves, but mischievous to society." Id. at 67.
76. Id. at 140.
77. Id. at 141. The journeyman tailors case involved the issue of the sufficiency of an
indictment. The defendants were convicted for demanding higher wages than were specified by
statute. It was held that "the omission in not concluding this indictment contraformam statuti
is not material, because it is for a conspiracy, which is an offence at common law." The King
v. Journeymen Tailors of Cambridge, 88 Eng. Rep. 9, 10 (1721), reprinted in K. WEDDER-
BURN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOUR LAW 371-72 (1967) (emphasis in original).
78. 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note I, at 190.
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Whenever a statute directs a particular measure, or estab-
lishes any regulations, without prohibiting in express terms, the
violation of them, and prescribing a punishment, any party con-
travening such regulations, is by the common law subject to in-
dictment; and the indictment is, technically speaking, styled an
indictment at common law. I will readily admit, that where per-
sons combine to accomplish an unlawful object, that is the true
distinction, whether that object be unlawful at common law, or
rendered so by statute . . ..
Accordingly, an indictment properly might be brought at common
law based on the intended violation of statutory provisions; only in
that sense did English authority support the common law offense of
a conspiracy to raise wages.
The Recorder presiding over the case, Moses Levy, instructed
the jury regarding the law of the case. Levy's charge incorporated
the broadest definition of conspiracy found in any of the cases. He
stated as follows: "A combination of workmen to raise their wages
may be considered in a two fold point of view: one is to benefit them-
selves . . the other is to injure those who do not join their society.
The rule of law condemns both." 80 He further cautioned the jury
that they were to apply the rule regardless of whether they under-
stood it, for their understanding was limited: "As well might a circle
of a thousand miles diameter be described by the man, whose eye
could only see a single inch, as the common law be characterized by
those who have not devoted years to its study."81 He assured the
jury, however, that "there is often great reason for an institution,
though a superficial observer may not be able to discover it."8 Con-
cerning the purely legal issue of the content of the common law rule,
Levy thus simply informed the jury that there did exist a principle of
law that they were obligated to apply, regardless of their under-
standing of that principle. Levy's hostility and bias toward the work-
ers is routinely noted by scholars.8"
With regard to the second analytical category involving the ide-
ological content of the conspiracy doctrine, the prosecution sought to
evoke a vision 6f community that was dependent on the individual's
freedom to acquire and dispose of property. Equality and autonomy
79. Id. at 194.
80. Id. at 233.
81. Id. at 232.
82. Id. at 233.
83. For example, Turner analyzed the conspiracy prosecutions using "judicial hostility"
as an explanatory factor. Examining Levy's rulings and charge in the trial, she concludes that
he promoted conviction of the defendants. M. TURNER, supra note 46, at 39-42.
91 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW SPRING 1987
therefore consisted of "no more than the provision of means whereby
individuals might constitute and regulate their own lives and prop-
erty through the medium of contract."8 In contrast, the defense de-
picted a communal prosperity based on the contributions of the
working class and their collective pursuit of fair economic reward
and social status.
Explaining the rationale that would justify the American adop-
tion of the asserted English precedent, prosecuting attorney Hopkin-
son emphasized the distinction between individual and concerted ac-
tivity and framed the terms of the debate around the concept of
communal liberty. He stated as follows:
This prosecution contravenes no man's right, it is to prevent
an infringement of right; it is in favour of the equal liberty of all
men, this is the policy of our laws; but if private associations and
clubs, can make constitutions and laws for us . . . if they can
associate and make bye-laws paramount, or inconsistent with the
state laws; What, I ask, becomes of the liberty of the people,
about which so much is prated; about which the [defense] coun-
sel made such a flourish!85
"Liberty" was thus limited to the pursuits of the individual worker
acting in isolation from his fellows, and that limitation was imposed
for the benefit of the community.
An association of workers, the prosecution continued, could
"undertake to regulate the trade of the city," thereby interfering
with the rights of all citizens. The interests of the community were
effectively safeguarded by the masters' resistance. to wage demands.
As Hopkinson remarked to the jury, "It must be plain to you, that
the master employers have no particular interest in the thing . . . if
they pay higher wages, you must pay higher for the articles. They, in
truth, are protecting the community." 86 In addition, to the extent
84. C. TOMLINS, THE STATE AND THE UNIONS: LABOR RELATIONS, LAW, AND THE OR-
GANIZED LABOR MOVEMENT IN AMERICAN, 1880-1960 (1985). Tomlins summarizes the de-
bate concerning the nature of "liberty" and "independence" as follows:
To many of the revolutionary generation, the liberty and independence
which they celebrated had promised the establishment of conditions which would
enable free men to contract with one another on a basis of real equality by
guaranteeing their economic and social independence. For others, however, a
revolution fought in behalf of liberty and property necessarily sanctified the lib-
erty of individuals to use their property productively, free from the restraints of
collective regulation. To the latter, that is, revolutionary liberty stood for liberty
of industry - entrepreneurial license.
Id. at 34-35 (emphasis in original).
85. 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note I, at 135.
86. Id. at 136-37.
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that the society coerced individual members into conformity with the
majority's will, it denied the individual his rights of independence
and liberty. In one particularly rhetorical passage, Hopkinson de-
picted the plight of the recalcitrant worker who refused to abide by
the rules of the society. The "dogs of vigilance," he said, "chase him
from shop to shop; they allow him no resting place, till he consents to
be one of their body; he is expelled [from] society, driven from his
lodgings, proscribed from working; he is left no alternative, but to
perish in the streets, or seek some other asylum on a more hospitable
shore." '87 Therefore, he admonished the jury, combinations were to
be condemned from a "double point of view" - first, based on "the
general policy, as it relates to the good of the community, and the
flourishing state of our manufactures," and secondly, from the per-
spective of "the liberty of individuals, and the enjoyment of common
and equal rights, secured by the constitution and laws."88
For the defense, Franklin and Rodney emphasized in their argu-
ments that the litigation was motivated by class antagonism. Refer-
ring to Smith's Wealth of Nations, Franklin argued- that workers
naturally combined to increase their wages just as masters naturally
conspired to lower them. In such contests, masters would normally
retain the advantage because they "could generally live a year or
two upon the stocks which they have already acquired." ' Rodney
elaborated the theme by pointing out that the combination of mas-
ters had as its object only the greater exploitation of labor and at-
tendant profit, and he cautioned that the consequences would be in-
jurious to the community. The masters, he said, "are not satisfied
with the rapid rate at which they are amassing wealth. They wish to
make their fortunes by a single turn of the wheel." Lower wages
would not in fact result in lower prices, but would merely force
skilled artisans to seek work in other cities. He warned the jury that
labor would not be cheaper as a result of conviction, but would rise
in value "in exact proportion to the scarcity of hands." He also
prophesied that "[tihose workmen who are not chained to the spot,
will fly the city ... -9 Concluding, Rodney reminded the jurors
that they were afforded "a constitutional power to decide the fact
87. Id. at 139-40.
88. Id. at 142.
89. Id. at 151; see also I A. SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 83-84 (R.H. Campbell,
A.S. Skinner & W.B. Todd eds. 1976) ("Of the Wages of Labour").
90. 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 198, 202. Rodney's argument, see id. at
198-202, is a forceful statement of the opposing economic interest at stake. Underlying his
analysis is the view that labor is "the source from whence the golden streams flow." Id. at 202.
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and the law,""' despite Levy's intimation to the contrary.
Closing for the prosecution, Ingersol reiterated the injury done
to nonmembers of the society, to the masters, and to the community;
such consequences, he said, rendered the defendants' acts unlawful.
The complaint against the defendants was simply stated as follows:
"Last October or November, in conformity with this article of the
[society's] constitution, they entered into an agreement to obtain an
advance of wages, and to punish, as heretofore stated, all who shall
contravene this regulation." 2 Even assuming no aggravating facts
were proved, Ingersol argued, the indictment fell within the accepted
legal definition of an unlawful conspiracy: "'Every confederacy to
injure individuals, or to do acts which are unlawful or prejudicial to
the community, is a conspiracy.' "' As to the masters, they suffered
from combinations of workers because they could not afford to retain
a nonmember of the society at the risk of losing the other journey-
men. There was an interference with the rights of the individual
worker to support or not support the society. Last, the combination
was "a measure highly prejudicial to the community" and threaten-
ing to the domestic manufacture of shoes.
94
Levy's instruction to the jury recapitulates the ideological thrust
of the conspiracy doctrine. Initially, he legitimized the institutional
process by which the shoemakers were to be oppressed. America, he
said, was a country in which the rule of law was supreme, and "the
will of no individual ought to be, or is admitted, to be the rule of
action." 95 Because courts administered the rule of law in a neutral
manner, they ineluctably commanded the allegiance and obedience
of all citizens. Levy instructed the jury as follows:
The moment courts of justice loose their respectability from
that moment the security of persons and of property is gone.
The moment courts of justice have their characters contami-
nated by a well founded suspicion, that they are governed by
caprice, fear or favour; from that moment they will cease to be
able to administer justice with effect, and redress wrongs of ei-
ther a public or private nature. Every consideration, therefore,
calls upon us to maintain the character of courts and juries; and
that can only be maintained by undeviating integrity, by an ad-
hesion to the rules of law, and by deciding impartially in con-
91. Id. at 204.
92. Id. at 209.
93. Id. at 210 (citing 4 Christian's Black. 136 n. 4).
94. Id. at 214.
95. Id. at 224.
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formity to them.96
By such statements, Levy sought to convince the workers, the jurors,
and the public of the legitimacy of the judicial proceeding.
Concerning the common law, Levy adopted a strategy of reifica-
tion through which the reality of the actual experience was sub-
sumed and distorted within a communicated reality. He described
the common law in the following idealized terms so as to reconcile
any perceived contradiction between existing social conditions and
revolutionary aspirations voiced by the workers:
An attempt has been made to shew that the spirit of the
revolution and the principle of the common law, are opposite in
this case. That the common law, if applied in this case, would
operate an attack upon the rights of man. The enquiry on that
point, was unnecessary and improper. Nothing more was re-
quired than to ascertain what the law is. The law is the perma-
nent rule, it is the will of the whole community. After that is
discovered, whatever may be its spirit or tendancy, it must be
executed, and the most imperious duty demands our submission
to it.97
Levy thus controverts the validity of the workers' arguments by de-
nying there can be any opposition between ideals of liberty and
equality and the rule of law. Indeed, "law" so fully engulfs the uni-
verse of social relations that it precisely corresponds with the consen-
sual nature of communal existence and embodies the definition of
freedom itself.96 It is therefore possible to accept the legal order be-
cause "the legal order substitutes a harmonious abstract experience
for the concrete alienation that characterizes [the individual's] lived
experience." 99
The policy underlying the common law rule was based on
Levy's version of the economic system of the community. He por-
trayed the cordwainers as a class having distinct interests antitheti-
cal to the interests of the world at large. Combination, in other
words, was an "unnatural, artificial means of raising the price of
96. Id. at 224-25.
97, Id. at 225.
98. In his codification of the common law, Blackstone posited law as the institutional
force mediating the "fundamental contradiction" between the autonomy of the individual
human and the power of the sovereign government. See Kennedy, The Structure of Black-
stone's Commentaries, 28 BUFFALO L. REV. 209, 372-82 (1979). Here, Levy identifies law as
the "will of the community" and denies that there can be any conflict between law and the
"rights of Man." Whatever is "discovered" to be law is necessarily compatible with ordered
civil society.
99. Gabel, Reification in Legal Reasoning, 3 RES. IN LAW AND Soc. 25, 26 (1980).
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work beyond its standard, and taking an undue advantage of the
public." 100 The shoemakers' society oppressed those journeymen in
indigent circumstances by preventing them from earning even the
lower wages offered by the masters, thereby further impoverishing
them. As Levy observed for the edification of the jury, "A father
cannot stand by and see, without agony, his children suffer; if he
does, he is an inhuman monster; he will be driven to seek bread for
them, either by crime, by beggary, or a removal from the city.''
Ultimately, Levy theorized; the power exercised by a combination of
workers would jeopardize the foundations of our economic system. If
the journeymen were permitted to turn out against the masters,
"they might raise the price of boots to thirty, forty, or fifty dollars a
pair, at least for some time, and until a competent supply could be
got from other places."'01 2 The obvious conclusion for Levy was that
"[i]n every point of view, this measure is pregnant with public mis-
chief and private injury . . . tends to demoralize the workmen...
destroy the trade of the city, and leaves the pockets of the whole
community to the discretion of the concerned."'0 3 It was also con-
trary to the "spirit of '76," which promised liberty under duly en-
acted law and not "a new legislature consisting of journeymen
shoemakers.' 0 4
B. New York Cordwainers
In the decade following the conviction of the Philadelphia cord-
wainers, there were two other important prosecutions that signifi-
cantly contributed to the development of the conspiracy doctrine.
The New York Cordwainers case' °5 in 1810 was initially argued as a
motion to quash the indictment, and it affords the most comprehen-
sive analysis of the law of conspiracy during the period. The Pitts-
burgh Cordwainers case,1°6 decided in 1815, is a useful illustration
of the evolution and solidification of the doctrine.
The indictment in New York Cordwainers alleged the unlawful
formation and conduct of a society of workers. Once in existence,
100. 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note I, at 228.
101. Id. at 230.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 235.
105. The case was reported by William Sampson, counsel for the defendants. That re-
port is reprinted in 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note I, at 251. The official report is
People v. Melvin, 2 Wheeler 262 (1810).
106. Commonwealth v. Morrow (Court of Quarter Sess. Allegheny Cty. 1815 4 Docu-
MENTARY HISTORY, supra note I, at 15.
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according to the charge, the society demanded wage increases from
the respective masters, and it was further agreed that no member of
the society would work for a master who employed nonmembers or
who would not accept certain other terms demanded by the society.
In addition, it was charged that the society injured one Edward
Whitess by preventing him from following his trade as a shoemaker.
William Sampson argued the motion on behalf of the defend-
ants to quash the indictment. Tracing the law of conspiracy to its
British origins, Sampson distinguished the offences of conspiracy,
champerty, and maintenance, all of which were subsumed under the
generic term of "conspiracy." Those offenses, Sampson argued, de-
pended on the existence of positive law and could not be enforced
without statutory authority. He inquired whether there was control-
ling public law in force in New York and concluded as follows:
The silence of our statutes, the silence of our records, shows
that there is none; and the definition in affirmance of the com-
mon law, shows that there could be none; and that even in Eng-
land, there never was any other than those statutes of labourers,
which it is not pretended ever were of force in this country, and
which are all repealed if they ever had been in force here.
10 7
In any event, Sampson asserted, the British statutes were class-based
in origin and as a consequence of those statutes, "the most useful
class in England is rendered the most miserable, and grows poor as
its oppressors grow rich." 108 Because American judges had discretion
to accept or reject British law, such precedent should not be binding,
even assuming the prosecution's statement of it had been accurate.
Concerning the authority of the Philadelphia Cordwainers pre-
cedent, Sampson mounted an extensive challenge to Levy's reasoning
in the case. First, Sampson controverted the applicability of British
law, which Levy had accepted. While some portions of the common
law remained in force, Sampson agreed, no part that was not consis-
tent with ideals of the Revolution could survive. He commented,
In Philadelphia, the recorder says, you shall not even in-
quire whether the act in judgment is or is not an attack upon the
rights of man. But the constitution of this state is founded on
the equal rights of men, and whatever is an attack upon these
rights is contrary to the constitution.109
107. 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 260-61.
108. Id. at 262.
109. Id. at 279.
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Thus, Sampson concluded that regardless of its doctrinal validity,
the Philadelphia case was inappropriate to the ideals of American
democracy.
Next, Sampson reviewed Levy's interpretation of the law of con-
spiracy and criticized Levy's misunderstanding of that law. The pas-
sage from Hawkins, the British authority on which Levy relied, was
in Sampson's view incorrectly stated. According to Sampson, Haw-
kins had referred in his treatise to a common law conspiracy to
falsely charge a third person as the father of a bastard child, which
fell within the statutory proscription of false accusations. Sampson
therefore concludes, "The notion that confederating to do any thing
indirectly tending to impoverish a third person, is indictable at com-
mon law, is so puerile a mistake, that I feel distressed to be under
the necessity of exposing it."11 He pointed out that the term "indi-
rect" reflected a corruption of the French droit.1" 1 Despite its ap-
pearance in some reports, Sampson said that "there is no adjudged
case where any act has been held indictable as a conspiracy at com-
mon law, whereof the essence . . . has not been falsehood, oppres-
sion, or unlawful maintenance, in some sort or other ....
As to the form of the indictment, Sampson acknowledged that
British cases were indictable "at common law." Yet those indict-
ments had a necessary connection with statutory law. Sampson ex-
plained that "[w]hen an offence is created by statute, and the statute
gives no particular penalty, the indictment not only may, but must,
be laid at common law, and a general judgment will be given, as of a
misdemeanor at common law."1 ' That legal technicality, however,
did not prove that a conspiracy charge could be maintained in the
absence of a statute.
Summarizing his position, Sampson reiterated that two princi-
ples governed the law of the case. The first was that "a conspiracy to
do any act, is not indictable unless the act to be done is indictable."
Second, "it must appear upon the fact of the indictment that the act
to be done is unlawful" or a showing of such circumstances must be
contained in the indictment. 1 4 Because the defendants agreed only
that they would not work with any journeyman not a member of the
society nor under certain prices, no unlawful act was alleged or
110. Id. at 281.
I 1l. "Droit" is defined as follows: "In French law, right, justice, equity, law, the whole
body of law; also a right." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 445 (5th ed. 1979).
112. 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note i, at 283.
113. Id. at 292.
114. Id. at 295.
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shown. Even had defendants conspired to raise their wages, such a
conspiracy was not unlawful unless there was a statute fixing wages.
Prosecuting attorney Emmet countered that the common law
had been adopted in New York and, in addition, the common law
rule prohibited the shoemakers' combination. After reviewing the
pertinent precedent, including the case of the Cambridge tailors,
Emmet advanced the proposition that "either a conspiracy unlaw-
fully to prejudice other individuals, or the public at large, is an of-
fence." 1"8 No statute, he argued, was necessary to make out the of-
fence when the conspiracy inured to the "'great impoverishment of
the people,'" such as a conspiracy to sell wool only for a fixed
price. 16 In a statement that exemplifies the ideological strategy of
dissimulation, Emmet articulated the policy rationale for prohibiting
combinations of workers. His argument succinctly asserts the inter-
ests of the community as opposed to the interests of the working
class, and the interests of the individual worker as opposed to the
interests of the group:
Individual rights are sufficiently secured by letting every
man, according to his own will, follow his own pursuits, while
public welfare forbids that combinations should be entered into
for private benefit, by the persons concerned in any employment
connected with the general welfare; in which combinations they
would make common cause against the community at large; and
in which the individual rights of those in the combining classes,
who may wish to be industrious, are most grievously violated;
because, if they were permitted to follow their pursuits, it would
tend to relieve society from the extortions of the conspirators.
These combinations are an infringement of that tacit compact
which all classes reciprocally enter into, that when they have
partitioned and distributed among them the different occupa-
tions conducive to general prosperity, they will pursue those oc-
cupations so as to contribute to the general happiness; and they
are therefore at war with public policy.'
Emmet's cogent formulation captures the essential ideology of the
conspiracy doctrine before Hunt.
Following the arguments on the motion to quash, the matter
was continued until the next session. Mayor DeWitt Clinton, the
presiding official, was absent in the February session, and no judg-
ment was rendered. Before the April session, Clinton left office, and
115. Id. at 324.
116. Id. at 326-27 (quoting Liber Assisarum, 27 Edw. III 138, 139).
117. Id. at 329.
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the new presiding officer, Jacob Radcliff, declared that he could not
issue an opinion because he had not heard the argument. There were
further delays, and it was determined to set the case for trial in July
1810.118 As a result, the question was submitted to a jury rather
than decided as a matter of law by the court.
At the trial, Sampson pointed out that the defense had conceded
all the facts charged in the indictment, and he viewed the question to
be "founded upon the law." Sampson, however, was unable to reiter-
ate his previous argument in its length and complexity under the
existing conditions, "at candle light, with sight so fatigued, and fac-
ulties so exhausted, and in a state of health so ill suited to exer-
tion."119 The prosecution emphasized in the closing argument that
the jurors, even though they had power to decide law and fact, were
not competent to resolve the convoluted legal principles surrounding
the doctrine. Those "abstruse deductions" from ancient precedent
were beyond their capacities:
[I]t never could be expected from the most intelligent ju-
rors that ever were empannelled, that they should, in the acci-
dental discharge of a duty for which they had no previous course
of preparation, follow the ablest and clearest logician through a
range of argument which it must have cost a practiced and edu-
cated lawyer so much time and trouble to compose. 20
Therefore, the jurors were to be guided in the law by the instructions
of the presiding official.
Radcliffe's charge to the jury promoted conviction. 2' In une-
quivocal terms, he stated that English common law did apply in New
York: "Our immediate ancestors claimed it as their birthright.'
'1 22
Radcliffe summarized the legal principle as a two-part analysis in-
distinguishable in content from Shaw's later formulation in Hunt.
According to Radcliffe, conspiracy was to be considered from a dual
aspect: "the one [point of view] where there existed a combination to
do an act, unlawful in itself, to the prejudice of other persons; the
other where the act done, or the object of it, was not unlawful, but
unlawful means were used to accomplish it."' 23 To insure that the
118. Under the circumstances, defense counsel chose to waive their motion to quash. Id.
at 361-62.
119. Id. at 373.
120. Id. at 380.
121. Turner says of Radcliffe's charge to the jury that his reasoning "leaves little doubt
that the judge was promoting conviction, particularly in view of the fact that the defense was
based mainly on the non-applicability of the English law." M. TURNER, supra note 46, at 43.
122. 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 383.
123. Id. at 382.
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jurors were cognizant of the "facts" of the case, Radcliffe instructed
that "[w]hatever might be the motives of the defendants, or their
object, the means thus employed were arbitrary and unlawful" and
fell within "one of the descriptions of the offence which had been
given. '"124 The defendants were duly convicted.
C. Pittsburgh Cordwainers
By the time of the Pittsburgh Cordwainers case"2 5 in 1815, the
legal discourse had become an arena for explicit policy debate re-
garding the welfare of the community. The theme emphasized by
Emmet in the New York Cordwainers prosecution now appeared as
a matter of course in the indictment. The defendants in the Pitts-
burgh case were alleged to have conspired to raise their wages and to
refuse work from any master employing journeymen who were not
members of the society. Further, according to the indictment, Pitts-
burgh "for a long time past has been a large trading and manufac-
turing town," and it was alleged that "great sums of money have
been acquired by the skill, industry and enterprize of the master
cordwainers of said borough," which tended to "the wealth, improve-
ment, and prosperity of the said borough, and the inhabitants
thereof."'2 Knowing that, the complaint averred, the journeymen
confederated together to do acts that impoverished masters and citi-
zens alike.
For the defendants, Walter Forward reviewed the English pre-
cedent and argued as Rodney and Sampson had argued that the of-
fense of conspiracy depended on the existence of a statute or on the
fraudulent support of another's claim. As to the policy of the law,
Forward depicted the purpose of the Pittsburgh case as economic
warfare against the journeymen: "The prosecution was instituted no-
toriously on the ground of their demanding higher wages; it followed
on the heels of the late turn-out, it would have vanished on their
acceptance of the former prices; its object is therefore manifest, and
can be neither disguised nor denied.
12 7
The wage demands of the journeymen, Forward calculated,
were negligible in comparison to the profit of the masters. He de-
duced that the return on capital to the masters amounted to "at least
seventy-five percent per annum." A pair of cossacks, for example,
124. Id. at 385.
125. Commonwealth v. Morrow (Court of Quarter Sess. Allegheny Cty. 1815), in 4
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 15.
126. 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 21.
127. Id. at 66.
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cost $8.75 to produce and were sold for $11.00, often for cash in
hand. 128 Under such circumstances, the society could hardly be re-
garded as oppressive. Indeed, Forward claimed, the society benefit-
ted the journeymen in the following respects: "it enabled them to
meet the employers on a footing of equality; protected the stranger
from imposition; promoted mutual kindness, and gave a home to the
disabled and the sick. 1'29 There was not, Forward concluded, any
unlawful injury to employers or nonmember journeymen.
Samuel Roberts, presiding over the court, instructed the jury in
a manner clearly favoring defendants' conviction. Addressing the
point of class conflict, Roberts deflected the jury from any possible
identification with the economic plight of the defendants. He ac-
knowledged that on the one hand there were a number of journey-
men "whom we are led to regard as poor men," and on the other
hand were the masters, "some of whom are represented as wealthy."
There was a tendency, he said, for the jurors to view the evidence
"as if the true question were, whether the journeymen were the op-
pressed, and the masters the oppressors - whether the profits of the
one class be not too great, and the remuneration of the other inade-
quate." He thus cautioned the jury that they were to have nothing to
do "with the regulation of wages, or the profit of the one or the
other."180 Roberts continued with an incisive recapitulation of the
ideological themes of the conspiracy doctrine:
It is not for demanding high prices that these men are en-
dicted, but for employing unlawful means to extort those prices.
For using means prejudicial to the community. Confederacies of
this kind have a most pernicious effect, as respects the commu-
nity at large. They restrain trade: they tend to banish many ar-
tizans, and to oppress others. It is the interest of the public, and
it is the right of every individual, that those who are skilled in
any profession, art, or mystery, should be unrestrained in the
exercise of it. It is particularly the interest of a trading and
manufacturing town (such as Pittsburg) that such freedom
should exist.18'
To insure that the jurors were not misled regarding the applica-
tion of the law, Roberts reviewed the charges against the defendants
and related those facts to the legal doctrine. He stated, "A conspir-
128. Id. at 66-67.
129. Id. at 68.
130. Id. at 80-81.
131. Id. at 81.
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acy to compel men to work, at certain prices, is doubtless endictable.
[Likewise], a conspiracy to compel an employer to hire only a cer-
tain description of persons, is endictable." It was also unlawful "to
conspire to compel men to become members of a particular associa-
tion, or to contribute towards it.' 3 2 There was an abundance of evi-
dence to support each point, Roberts stated. In conclusion, he posed
the following question to the jury: "put this question to yourselves
'from the evidence we have heard are we satisfied, that the defend-
ants did confederate together by indirect means to impoverish or
prejudice a third person, or to do acts unlawful or prejudicial to the
community?' "1 Presented with that instruction, the jury found the
defendants guilty.
D. Subsequent Cases
Between the Pittsburgh Cordwainers case in 1815 and Com-
monwealth v. Hunt in 1842, there were fourteen additional conspir-
acy litigations.'3" The definition of the offense during this period was
generally a matter of consensus among the parties. Joseph Ingersoll,
acting for the prosecution in the Twenty-Four Journeyman Tailors
case '35 of 1827, for example, concluded his survey of precedent with
a remark indicating that the legal principle was not in dispute. He
stated as follows: "But why search for definitions among the books,
when the candour of the [defense] counsel has furnished one at least
as comprehensive as any that they afford? 'A conspiracy,' he is will-
ing to admit, 'is an agreement to do an unlawful act, or a lawful act
by unlawful means.' "13 The defendants, the jury found in the case,
had unlawfully engaged in injuring and oppressing a third party.
87
As Ingersoll's formulation indicates, the means-end test was a recog-
nized doctrinal element of conspiracy.
Significantly, one of the salient departures from the means-end
distinction appears in the opinion of Chief Justice Savage of the Su-
132. Id. at 82.
133. Id. at 86-87.
134. M. TURNER, supra note 46, at 2, lists fifteen cases, but one of those involves a suit
brought by a worker against his employer. The earliest compilation of cases was prepared by
Nelles, Commonwealth v. Hunt, supra note 46, at 1166-69.
135. Commonwealth v. Moore (Mayor's Court Phila. 1827), in 4 DOCUMENTARY His-
TORY, supra note I, at 99.
136. 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note I, at 232. Ingersoll pointed out that the
issue of the legality of a conspiracy to raise wages remained questionable. However, he said,
"it never was doubted that other combinations - such for example as this [case], to oppress
and ruin, which is imputed to the present defendants - were highly criminal." Id. at 233.
137. The offense was thus identical to the offense alleged in the Hunt indictment. The
charge to the jury is set forth id. at 247-64.
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preme Court of New York in People v. Fisher.38 In Fisher, the jour-
neymen shoemakers agreed that they would not make coarse boots
for less than one dollar per pair. A journeyman named Pennock per-
formed work for Lum, a master, below the price; the other shoemak-
ers turned out against Lum and subsequently were charged with un-
lawful conspiracy. The court of general sessions dismissed the
indictment, ruling that it did not describe an offense "known to and
recognized by the state.""' 9
Reversing the lower court, Chief Justice Savage referred to a
New York statute prohibiting conspiracies that were injurious "to
trade or commerce." A conspiracy to raise wages, he held, fell within
the proscription. Savage concluded that the common law prohibited
conspiracies even for a lawful end and cited the report of the Jour-
neymen Tailors in 8 Mod. as support for that proposition. Conse-
quently, the conspiracy was unlawful by virtue of its impact on the
public, and it was unnecessary to examine the specific means by
which the object was sought. Savage explained his conclusion in
terms of the communal welfare:
It is important to the best interests of society that the price
of labor be left to regulate itself, or rather be limited by the
demand for it. Combinations and confederacies to enhance or
reduce the prices of labor, or of any articles of trade or com-
merce, are injurious. They may be oppressive, by compelling the
public to give more for an article of necessity or of convenience
than it is worth; or on the other hand, of compelling the labor of
the mechanic for less than its value.
14 0
Savage's reasoning was followed the next year by Judge Ed-
wards in Twenty Journeymen Tailors'4' when he found the defend-
ants guilty of an unlawful conspiracy and imposed fines totalling
$1,150 against them. In the sentencing, Edwards observed as follows:
"Every American knows, or ought to know, that he has no better
friend than the laws, and that he needs no artificial combination for
his protection."M'4 The citizens of New York, in response, hanged
Savage and Edwards in effigy.' 4a
138. 14 Wend. 9 (1835).
139. Id. at 12.
140. Id. at 19. In Savage's view, combinations interfered with the "market" economy.
Wages were properly regulated by the demand for an article, provided that they were not
enhanced by the "forced and artificial means" of conspiracy. Id.
141. People v. Faulkner (1836), in 4 DOCuMENTARY HISTORY, supra note I, at 315.
142. Id. at 330-31.
143. Witte, supra note 46, at 827; see also C. TOMLINS, supra note 84, at 39.
CONSPIRACY DOCTRINE
That same year, 1836, a group of shoemakers in Hudson, New
York, were acquitted of conspiracy in an indictment brought under
the statute. 144 The legal rule propounded by Savage and Edwards
was vigorously debated, and the earlier version of the conspiracy
doctrine protecting lawful objectives and methods was reaffirmed in
its essentials. The Hudson shoemakers allegedly conspired to raise
their wages, to punish any member who broke the society's rules,
and to refuse to work for any master who employed a nonmember.
The allegations were thus materially indistinguishable from those in
Fisher.
Arguing for the defense in the Hudson case, John Edmonds in-
terpreted Fisher to signify that a conspiracy to raise wages was un-
lawful even though both ends and means were lawful. Edmonds criti-
cized Savage's reliance on the authority of 8 Mod. as being
misconceived and erroneous, and he raised once again the point that
the English law in the case of the Cambridge tailors was based on a
statute. He insisted that the correct law, as set forth by the New
York Court of Errors, defined a conspiracy to be "a combination of
two or more, to obtain an unlawful end by lawful means or a lawful
end by unlawful means.' 45 The necessary but incorrect principle un-
derlying Fisher, according to Edmonds, was that an agreement to
seek a lawful end was rendered unlawful by the combination itself.
As to the purported injury to the community, Edmonds argued that
the drafters of the New York statute did not intend to proscribe la-
bor disputes. A strike against one master did not harm the public
because "other masters sold more. The same numbers were made
and consumed." ' 41 Edmonds' arguments prevailed in the case.
As the foregoing analysis demonstrates, the means-end ap-
proach was a common feature of the conspiracy cases which pre-
ceded Hunt. Moreover, the basic factual pattern was reiterated in
every case: workers demanded higher wages and better working con-
ditions and sought to obtain those demands through sanctions
against obdurate masters and recalcitrant fellow journeymen. What
occasionally did vary was the application of the law to the facts,
144. See People v. Cooper (N.Y. Ct. of General Sess. 1836), in 4 DOCUMENTARY His-
TORY, supra note 1, at 277.
145. 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note I, at 300. Edmonds refers to the decision of
the Court of Errors in People v. Lambert, 9 Cow. 578. See id.
146. 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 306. Regarding "market" forces, Ed-
monds argued that "[ijf the journeyman tailors, by means of their combinations, get the prices
of their work so high that we cannot afford to pay them, we shall not go without clothes, we
shall make them ourselves as you do now and for the same reason, because it is our interest to
do so. ... Id. at 307.
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which was influenced by the judicial official presiding over the case.
Hunt nevertheless was a significant departure from its predecessors.
Most importantly, it introduced a new ideology into the discourse of
employment relations by substituting a view grounded on "contract"
for the previous concern with community and social policy.
V. The Hunt Decision and Its Aftermath
The allegations against the shoemakers in Commonwealth v.
Hunt147 were materially identical to those in the Philadelphia, New
York, and Pittsburgh cases. The defendants were charged with con-
spiring to form a society to govern themselves and other workmen, to
"extort great sums of money by means thereof," and to refuse to
work for any master who employed a nonmember journeyman. Spe-
cifically, the defendants allegedly compelled Wait, a master, to turn
out Horne, a journeyman who refused to pay a penalty assessed by
the society. The defendants were found guilty at the municipal court
level.14 8 On appeal to the Massachusetts Supreme Court, the disposi-
tive issue involved the sufficiency of the indictment. Robert Rantoul,
Jr., counsel for the defense, argued that the indictment failed to set
forth "any agreement to do a criminal act, or to do any lawful act by
criminal means" 1 9 and, consequently, that the jury should have been
instructed that there was no indictable offense.
In his opinion, Shaw commenced his analysis with the following
definition of an unlawful conspiracy: it is "a combination of two or
more persons, by some concerted action, to accomplish some crimi-
nal or unlawful purpose, or to accomplish some purpose, not in itself
criminal or unlawful, by criminal or unlawful means."' 150 From that
147. 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 111 (1842).
148. The proceeding in the lower court is reported in Thacher's Criminal Cases 609
(1840). In his charge to the jury, Judge Thacher stated as follows:
This case is as important in principle as any one which was ever tried in this
court. I think, that we have all attended to it with diligence, and without
prejudice. I am of opinion, and it is my duty to instruct you, as a matter of law,
that this society of journeymen bootmakers, thus organized for the purposes de-
scribed in the indictment, is an unlawful conspiracy against the laws of this com-
monwealth. It is a new power in the state, unknown to its constitution and laws,
and subversive of their equal spirit. If such associations should be organized and
carried into operation through the varying grades, professions and pursuits of the
people of this commonwealth, all industry and enterprise would be suspended,
and all property would become insecure. It would involve in one common, fatal
ruin, both laborer and employer, and the rich as well as the poor. It would tend
directly to array them against each other, and to convulse the social system to its
centre.
Id. at 653-54.
149. 45 Mass. (4 Met.) at 114.
150. Id. at 123.
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definition, Shaw concluded, it followed that a sound indictment must
set forth specifically either the unlawful purpose of the conspiracy or
the unlawful means by which a lawful purpose was to be accom-
plished. Such, he said, was "the result of the English authorities,
although they are not quite uniform."' 1
Proceeding to the actual case, Shaw noted that Judge Thacher
in the lower court had refused to declare the indictment invalid and
had, instead, instructed the jury that the conspiracy had an unlawful
act as its objective and that defendants intended to effect the unlaw-
ful objective by unlawful means. Based on the contents of the indict-
ment, Shaw found the charges to consist of a single averment, "that
the defendants and others formed themselves into a society, and
agreed not to work for any person, who should employ any journey-
man or other person, not a member of such society, after notice
given him to discharge such workman."' 52 According to Shaw, such
an allegation did not constitute a proper indictment.
Shaw observed that the intention of the Bootmakers Society was
to "induce all those engaged in the same occupation to become mem-
bers of it." That purpose was "not unlawful." Distinguishing be-
tween legitimate and "dangerous and pernicious" purposes, Shaw
ruled that unlawful ends should be "specially charged," for the de-
fendants might have had laudable objectives, such as the economic
and moral support of its members. However, if there were a secret
agreement concerning purposes "injurious to the peace of society or
the rights of its members," then such a confederation would consti-
tute an unlawful conspiracy.153
Continuing, Shaw held that the means chosen to effectuate the
defendants' ends were not unlawful. The defendants were not bound
by contract, but were "free to work for whom they please[d], or not
to work." Likewise, Shaw noted, this was not a case in which the
defendants sought the discharge of a person having a fixed contract
with the master; consequently, there was no unlawful interference
with a contractual relationship. Shaw also carefully excepted from
his principle those situations in which an employment contract ex-
isted and a group of workers simultaneously terminated their
employment.1
54
151. Id. at 126.
152. Id. at 128.
153. Id. at 129.
154. Shaw stated as follows:
Suppose a farmer, employing a large number of men, engaged for the year,
at fair monthly wages, and suppose that just at the moment that his crops were
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The allegation that defendants compelled Wait to discharge
Horne did not state a criminal offense, Shaw concluded. Neither
force nor fraud was alleged as an element of the compulsion. Shaw
reiterated that the legality of defendants' conduct might have turned
on a contractual relation between Wait and Horne; the "established
principle," according to Shaw, was that "every free man, whether
skilled laborer, mechanic, farmer or domestic servant, may work or
not work, or work or refuse to work with any company or individual,
at his own option, except so far as he is bound by contract.'
1 55
Regarding Horne's impoverishment through the actions of the
Society, Shaw perceived no criminal impairment of Horne's rights.
In significant contrast to the previous conspiracy prosecutions, Shaw
does not discuss the injury to the community resulting from the loss
of employment of a nonmember journeyman. Rather, Shaw poses a
hypothetical situation to illustrate the benefit of competition in a free
market society. If, for example, consumers of bread concertedly re-
fuse to patronize a baker whose prices are excessive and solicit a
rival baker to establish a bakery, the first baker may be impover-
ished through a conspiracy; nevertheless, Shaw continues, it is
through competition that "the best interests of trade and industry
are promoted."' 56 Accordingly, a conspiracy to impoverish another is
not of itself a criminal offense, provided the object is not effectuated
by unlawful means.
Regarding the issue of the workers' demands for higher wages,
necessarily implicit in the conspiracy doctrine, Shaw summarily dis-
missed the subject. Despite the fact that both parties raised argu-
ments relating to the law of conspiracies to raise wages, he found
that the indictment "[did] not aver a conspiracy or even an intention
[by defendants] to raise their wages; and it appears by the bill of
exceptions, that the case was not put upon the footing of a conspir-
acy to raise their wages."' 57 Thus, according to Shaw, the decision in
People v. Fisher was distinguishable on the ground that there was a
statutory prohibition in that case against conspiracies injurious to
ready to harvest, they should all combine to quit his service, unless he would
advance their wages, at a time when other laborers could not be obtained. It
would surely be a conspiracy to do an unlawful act, though of such a character,
that if done by an individual, it would lay the foundation of a civil action only,
and not of a criminal prosecution.
Id. at 131. The implicit basis of the civil-criminal distinction is that a contract action is the
appropriate sanctioning system for individual workers, while a criminal prosecution is suitable
to punish collective activity.
155. Id. at 133.
156. Id. at 134.
157. Id. at 131-32.
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trade or commerce, including conspiracies to raise wages. Based on
the foregoing reasoning, Shaw determined that the indictment in the
case did not charge a "criminal conspiracy punishable by law.'
'18
Shaw's conclusion has evoked substantial disagreement among
scholars on two major points. The first source of controversy con-
cerns the extent to which, if at all, the Hunt decision modified the
previous law of the conspiracy doctrine. Second, assuming that there
was some modification of the doctrine, it is problematic that the law,
so overtly pro-capitalist in earlier cases, should apparently benefit
the working class. The anomaly is compounded by the fact that
Shaw had just previously issued his decision in Farwell v. Boston
and Worcester Rail Road Corp.,15 9 which established common law
principles significantly limiting compensation for injured workers.
Among the legal community, reaction to the Hunt case during
the nineteenth century generally was tepid. While the case was men-
tioned by some treatise writers, others saw little of distinction in the
decision, and several writers "ignored it completely.' 60 Prosecutors
and judges were indifferent to the opinion, and there were at least
twenty-five conspiracy suits successfully prosecuted between the
1860's and the 1880's."6I Hunt, then, was not perceived immediately
to be a definitive judicial treatment of the conspiracy doctrine.
In his 1926 analysis of the Hunt case, Professor Edwin Witte
discussed the misapprehension that Hunt overthrew "archaic doc-
trines" on which earlier cases were based.162 To the contrary, Witte
said, "[t]he unreported cases of the early nineteenth century did not
turn upon the legality of the unions per se, but on the methods which
they employed to gain their ends."'" Witte further argued that in
158. Id. at 136.
159. 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 49 (1842). Horwitz analyzes the Farwell decision as follows:
The doctrine of "assumption of risk" in workmen's injury cases expressed
the triumph of the contractarian ideology more completely than any other nine-
teenth century legal creation. It arose in an economy which already had all but
eradicated traces of an earlier model of normative relations between master and
servants. And without the practice of enforcing preexisting moral duties, judges
and jurists could no longer ascribe any purpose to legal obligations that were
superior to the expressed "will" of the parties. As contract ideology thus emas-
culated all prior conceptions of substantive justice, equal bargaining power inevi-
tably became established as the inarticulate major premise of all legal and eco-
nomic analysis. The circle was completed; the law had come simply to ratify
those forms of inequality that the market system produced.
M. HOROWITZ, supra note 68, at 210. Horowitz's insight applies with equal force to the Hunt
decision.
160. Holt, supra note 46, at 642.
161. Id,
162. Witte, supra note 46, at 825.
163. Id. at 826.
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only two cases, Philadelphia Cordwainers and People v. Fisher,
were combinations to raise wages deemed unlawful. Hunt merely ar-
ticulated with greater clarity "the distinction vaguely hinted at in
[the] early cases," and, aside from that contribution, Hunt "seems to
have had comparatively little effect upon the development of the law
of labor combinations in this country." 6 Criminal conspiracy prose-
cutions continued into the 1880's, Witte notes.
16 5
The first extended scholarly analysis of Hunt appeared in
1932.166 In that study, Professor Walter Nelles concluded that Hunt
changed prior law and proposed that the case could be explained in
political terms as a contest between the Jeffersonian and Tory posi-
tions. He acknowledged the "paradox" that Hunt was "a seeming
victory of Jeffersonianism in a Tory state and in the court dominated
by the great but far from Jeffersonian Chief Justice Shaw."' 6 , In
Nelles' view, Shaw was most heavily influenced by legislation pend-
ing before the Massachusetts legislature to protect the textile indus-
try within the state. Nelles argued that by 1842, the American econ-
omy was sufficiently depressed that labor agitation was not a threat
to employers; however, working class support was necessary to insure
passage of protective tariffs. Evaluating the relevant political con-
text, Nelles remarked as follows: "what has preceded suggests that
the campaign for tariff protection may have had a larger share of
responsibility for the decision of Commonwealth v. Hunt than the
reasons stated in the opinion."'68 He added that the language of the
opinion provided ample safeguards for employers, in that a combina-
tion to breach a contract of employment or to induce breach re-
mained a criminal offense. 69 Shaw's "liberalism," accordingly, was
a facade adopted to attain an explicit political objective.
In his study of Shaw's judicial career, Leonard Levy attempted
to refute Nelles' thesis. °17 Levy claimed, first of all, that the case
radically transformed the law of criminal conspiracy: "Common-
wealth v. Hunt . . . is the Magna Carta of American trade-union-
ism, for it removed the stigma of criminality from labor organiza-
tions." 17' Levy's analysis of the case turns on Shaw's application of
the law to the particular fact situation. For Shaw, a union's coercive
164. Id. at 828-29.
165. Id. at 828-32.
166. Nelles, Commonwealth v. Hunt, supra note 46.
167. Id. at 1130.
168. Id. at 1162.
169. Id.
170. See L. LEVY, supra note 46, at 183-206.
171. Id. at 183.
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pressures on nonmember workers was within the acceptable limits of
a competitive economy. Even though Levy concedes that courts
before and after Shaw had found and would find identical activities
to constitute both unlawful ends and means, he nevertheless de-
scribes the result reached by Shaw to constitute the "legal founda-
tion of trade unionism. '"172
Levy rejects Nelles' theory regarding tariff legislation as incon-
sistent with the actual circumstances surrounding the litigation. He
points out, "there is not the slightest evidence to suggest that Lemuel
Shaw believed in protective tariffs. 173 Moreover, Levy asserts, Shaw
was not simply a political pawn in some grand legislative design:
Contrary to Professor Nelles, [Shaw's] decisions most defi-
nitely could not be dictated nor influenced by the fear of politi-
cal consequences or of criticism, no matter how radical. He was
the very man who would invite trouble for the sake of principle.
His whole judicial career is evidence of supreme integrity built
upon devotion to, even obsession with, principle.
1 74
Consequently, Nelles' explanation is simply a "crude theory of judi-
cial decision in which considerations of law are completely
ignored.
1'75
Levy, however, offers an interpretation of Shaw's decision that
is likewise extraneous to the substantive legal merits of the case. Ac-
cording to Levy, there was popular sentiment in the early 1840's to
codify the common law of Massachusetts. Leaders of the movement
were radical Democrats such as Frederick Robinson and Robert
Rantoul, Jr., the defense attorney in Hunt. The codificationists vigor-
ously attacked the common law on the ground that it was an instru-
ment of oppression under the control of the aristocracy and antitheti-
cal to the interests of the ordinary citizens; they urged legislative
reform to reduce the power and discretion of judges. 76 Shaw, in con-
172. Id. at 189.
173. Id. at 195.
174. id. at 196.
175. Id.
176. See, e.g., Rantoul, Oration at Scituate, Masschusetts, 4 July 1836, in READINGS IN
AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 472 (M. Howe ed. 1949) [hereinafter READINGS]; Robinson, On
Reform of Law and the Judiciary in an Oration Delivered before the Trades Union of Boston
and Vicinity, July 4, 1834, in READINGS, supra, at 455. The criticisms of common law ad-
vanced by contemporary critical theorists, see infra text accompanying notes 195-198, were
forcefully anticipated by Rantoul in 1836. He argued as follows:
Judge-made law is special legislation. The judge is human, and feels the
bias which the coloring of the particular case gives. If he wishes to decide the
next case differently, he has only to distinguish, and thereby make a new law.
The legislature must act on general views, and prescribe at once for a whole
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trast, "cherished the traditional system." Levy continues as follows:
To [Shawl the common law was a science, founded upon
pure reason and natural justice adapted to the conditions of soci-
ety . . . .Life, liberty, and property were insured by it; stability
and progress too. Its fixed principles, so intrinsically perfect and
comprehensive, allowed for modifications in public policy and
habit, yet maintained the necessary ingredients of duration and
certainty.
17
Given Shaw's convictions, Levy asserts, Shaw was committed to
the defeat of the codification movement and drafted Hunt so as to
demonstrate the fairness and neutrality of the common law, thus de-
flating the claims of the codificationists. Levy acknowledged that his
interpretation of Hunt was "cautiously advanced," yet he concluded
that the codificationists "lost their chief arguing point when Shaw
handed down his opinion in Commonwealth v. Hunt.''178 Even
though the codification movement had declined in impetus by 1842
and Hunt "was not a stake through the heart of codification," the
case was nonetheless "another nail in the coffin. 179
The codification view espoused by Levy, like Nelles' tariff expla-
nation, invokes the process of legitimation. In short, Shaw arrived at
a result that was not necessarily dictated by the internal logic of the
case, but by the institutional requisites of the common law. Hunt, on
that view, is consistent with Shaw's presumed class bias in favor of
capitalist employers, because it strengthened the broad control of the
judiciary over the legal relations of production.
In the most recent treatment of Hunt and the conspiracy doc-
trine, Wythe Holt advances a similar conclusion. He says, "Shaw did
class of cases ....
The judge makes law, by extorting from precedents something which they
do not contain. He extends his precedents, which were themselves the extension
of others, till, by this accommodating principle, a whole system of law is built up
without the authority or interference of the legislator ....
These objections to the common law have a peculiar force in America, be-
cause the rapidly advancing state of our country is continually presenting new
cases for the decision of the judges; and by determining these as they arise, the
bench takes for its share more than half of our legislation, notwithstanding the
express provisions of the Constitution that the judiciary shall not usurp the func-
tions of the legislature. If a common law system could be tolerable anywhere, it
is only where every thing is stationary. With us, it is subversive of the funda-
mental principles of a free government, because it deposits in the same hands the
power of first making the general laws, and then applying them to individual
cases; powers distinct in their nature, and which ought to be jealously separated.
Rantoul, supra, at 475-78.
177. L. LEVY, supra note 46, at 198.
178. Id. at 199.
179. Id. at 202.
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not stray from his class learnings, in intention, legal meaning or ef-
fect. Rather, he brilliantly solved a problem of ideology and legiti-
macy in the time-honoured common law tradition, using supposedly
neutral rules to make labour law seem fair and evenhanded.' 0 Holt
refers to four specific respects in which the Hunt opinion furthered
the interests of employers. First, Shaw established that the common
law of conspiracy was in force in Massachusetts, and he expanded
that law by holding that no overt act was necessary to the offense.181
Second, Shaw made clear that conspiracies were punishable when
they were instruments of "oppression or injustice."'1 2 Third, unions
were prohibited from coercing uncooperative workers when such ac-
tivity interfered with an employment contract. 18 Fourth, the lan-
guage of the opinion insured that the labor conspiracy doctrine
would not be applied to capitalist entrepreneurs, among whom com-
petition was an unavoidable tendency. 8
Holt concludes that the import of Hunt was largely ideological.
The opinion did not preclude subsequent criminal prosecutions, but
it did act to legitimate the common law system. The conspiracy doc-
trine, Holt argues, had become overtly class-biased and threatened
to erode the legitimacy of judicial authority. Shaw consequently
"was restoring the common law to an appearance of fairness," and
the decision also meshed with "[t]he contractarian core of the
emerging laissez-faire culture [that] demanded the appearance of an
approximation of equality between bargainers."18 5 Accordingly, the
significance of the decision inheres in its social import rather than its
development of legal principle.
From a doctrinal standpoint, the most careful treatment of
Hunt is that of Marjorie Turner.' Her work provides a convenient
summary of several significant points and a context for further anal-
ysis. Turner evaluates Hunt on the basis of three areas of inquiry.
First, she asks, did the decision preclude the prosecution of labor
180. Holt, supra note 46, at 640 (emphasis in original).
181. Id. at 644.
182. Id. at 644-45.
183. Id. at 645-46. On this point, Holt notes:
In an age of contractarianism, when the usual form of labour oppression
was rapidly becoming that fiction of freedom and individualism embodied in the
notion of contract, and when contracts were actually becoming much more use-
ful in an economy increasingly concerned with commodities futures and with
time and distance . . . Shaw had quite naturally sensed the organic needs of his
culture.
Id. at 646.
184. Id. at 646-47.
185. Id. at 652.
186. M. TURNER, supra note 46, at 58-72.
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organizations? Second, did it confer substantive rights on workers?
Third, did the case legalize the closed shop or the right to strike?
She concludes that the answer to each question is "no. ' 187 Far from
affirmatively protecting union activities, Shaw more completely de-
scribed the offense of conspiracy and formulated the conditions
under which it could be prosecuted. Closed shops and strikes, for
example, were deemed unlawful when the existence of "force or
fraud" was alleged, or when the employer was induced to breach an
employment contract. Thus, Turner concludes that "rather than up-
holding the closed shop or the right to strike, Shaw was really pro-
viding the rationale for their control.' 88
With regard to Hunt as judicial precedent, Turner found that in
the ten-year period following Hunt, there were no conspiracy prose-
cutions; she does not accept, however, that the lack of such cases is
attributable to the influence of Hunt. Continuing forward from the
1850's, Turner discusses a number of cases relying on Hunt. She
summarizes the review as follows:
Tallying the results thus far, I find only two labor cases
citing Commonwealth v. Hunt as the basis for acquittal, and one
of these was primarily on the issue of interfering with justice.
On the other hand, I found eight labor cases in which either
Commonwealth v. Hunt was an insufficient defense or was actu-
ally an aid to conviction. At least two other labor convictions
were decided upon the authority of one of these eight. Thus I
conclude from this survey that Commonwealth v. Hunt contrib-
uted more to the continued though modified use of the labor
conspiracy doctrine than to its demise. 189
Noting that Hunt had slight actual influence on legal doctrine, Tur-
ner nonetheless perceives that the decision did have an institutional
importance: "[I]t deepened the roots of 'judicial empiricism,' or per-
mitted what Sayre calls law without predictability, i.e., law based on
judges' 'personal predilictions and particular dispositions.' "190
Generally, then, the consensus of scholarly opinion, supported
by the analysis in section III above,' 9' is that Hunt did not constitute
a major substantive change in the doctrine of criminal conspiracy.
There was a hiatus in prosecutions immediately after Hunt, but the
187. Id. at 65.
188. Id. at 68.
189. Id. at 71 (citations omitted).
190. Id. at 72 (quoting Sayre, supra note 46). Turner does not explain the "predilic-
tions" or "dispositions" that led Shaw to the specific result in Hunt.
191. See supra text accompanying notes 46-68.
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doctrine reappeared in its former vigor after the Civil War; indeed,
the 1867 case of State v. Donaldson, 9 2 which purports to distinguish
Hunt, was a leading opinion of the period. 19 The explanations seek-
ing to rationalize Shaw's political background and the apparently
pro-labor result in Hunt have in common a recognition that the legal
principles and reasoning in the opinion do not satisfactorily explain
the result in the case. Nelles' tariff theory, Levy's codification the-
ory, and Holt's legitimation theory all focus on some external goal
that ostensibly motivated Shaw. The point is substantiated by Tur-
ner's concluding observation that Hunt puts the judiciary "in
charge" of the outcomes in a given conspiracy prosecution. 19 4 None
of those explanations, however, is grounded on the economic realities
that gave rise to the legal rules in the first instance, and only within
that context can the evolution of the law adequately be assessed.
VI. Hunt and Workplace Discipline
The conspiracy doctrine originated out of the need of capitalists
to impose discipline on workers. With the advent of the factory sys-
tem, new forms of industrial organization and a "proletarianized"
working class emerged. The law of criminal conspiracy facilitated
those developments instrumentally and ideologically. Just as the
workplace control theory explains the genesis of the legal rule, it ex-
plains its particular permutation in Hunt. That decision did not cre-
ate new legal principles, but it did introduce new and significant
terms of discourse. Moreover, Shaw did not act contrary to the class
interests of capitalism, for the conspiracy doctrine was not by 1842
necessary, either economically or ideologically, to those interests.
A basic tenet of contemporary legal scholarship within the criti-
cal legal studies movement is that legal doctrine is intrinsically inde-
terminate. 19 While legal rules purport to be neutral, objective, and
determinate, those rules are in actuality manipulable and ambigu-
ous, permitting a great measure of discretion in their application.
According to critical legal scholars, "traditional legal theory requires
192. 32 N.J.L. 151 (1867).
193. See Holt, supra note 46, at 642.
194. Shaw's opinion "neither removed the possibility nor the likelihood, nor, for that
matter, made inevitable the application of the conspiracy doctrine to labor organizations." M.
TURNER, supra note 46, at 66.
195. For a recent treatment of the point, see Yablon, The Indeterminacy of the Law:
Critical Legal Studies and the Problem of Explanation, 6 CARDozo L. REV. 917 (1984). See
also Boyle, supra note 58; Klare, Traditional Labor Law Scholarship and the Crisis of Col-
lective Bargaining Law: A Reply to Professor Finkin, 44 MD. L. REV. 731 (1985); Singer, The
Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1 (1985).
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a relatively large amount of determinacy as a fundamental premise
of the rule of law. Our legal system, however, has never satisfied this
goal." 196 The crucial weakness of traditional legal reasoning is that
"legal results can never be adequately explained by doctrinal materi-
als." Likewise, policy is not an appropriate basis of judicial decision,
for "arguments from principles and policies, like doctrinal argu-
ments, are infinitely malleable. ' 197 Given such indeterminacy, it is
necessary to analyze the values implicit in labor law from a social
and historical perspective. 198
By the time of Hunt, the creation of a working class - that is,
the development of an adequate supply of labor for the new system
of production - had successfully been accomplished. After describ-
ing four significant sources of labor from which the early nineteenth-
century capitalist had been able to draw, Gordon, Edwards, and
Reich conclude that as of the early 1840's, "the dearth and dearness
of American labor no longer presented an insurmountable obstacle to
a growing capitalist sector." 199 The economy entered upon a period
of "consolidation" that extended into the 1870's and was character-
ized by rapid economic expansion.20 0 The authors note as follows:
"There can be little doubt . . . that the solution of the labor problem
provided the key to the construction of a viable social structure of
accumulation .
201
Hunt thus can be understood in light of the economic context
described by Gordon, Edwards, and Reich. Workers were not ac-
corded meaningful legal power as a consequence of the Hunt hold-
ing. With the availability of a reserve army of labor, employers were
not easily coerced by group activity. If workers undertook a strike,
the most efficacious response was to discharge the strikers and hire
more employees, rather than to engage in a lengthy criminal action.
The absence of prosecution immediately following Hunt2 02 is much
more consistent with the growing economic power of employers than
with the precedential force of Hunt, for, as observed, the decision
attracted little attention. Thus, one academic anomaly in interpreta-
196. Singer, supra note 195, at 13.
197. Yablon, supra note 195, at 930.
198. The classic example of critical methodology in labor law analysis is Klare, Judicial
Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937-
1941, 62 MINN. L. REv. 265 (1977). See also Klare, Labor Law as Ideology, 4 INDUS. REL.
L.J. 450 (1981).
199. D. GORDON, R. EDWARDS & M. REICH, supra note 8, at 77.
200. Id. at 79-94.
201. Id. at 79.
202. "The only period for which no [conspiracy] cases were found was in the ten years
immediately following Commonwealth v. Hunt." M. TURNER, supra note 46, at 68.
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tion is removed.
The language of Hunt further supports the workplace control
and labor market explanation, in that the opinion depicts an eco-
nomic world profoundly different from the world of the earlier cases.
Hunt transformed the ideology of the conspiracy doctrine and gener-
ated a discourse of a markedly different tenor. Most significantly,
the notion of "community" figuring so prominently in the doctrine is
replaced by a universe dominated by the economic behavior of
individuals.
The greater part of Shaw's opinion in Hunt consists of a techni-
cal discussion regarding the form of the indictment. When address-
ing the policy underlying the conspiracy doctrine, which had been a
major concern of judges such as Levy and Roberts, and of Judge
Thacher in the trial court, 03 Shaw does not describe workers' combi-
nations as injurious to the community; rather, he depicts a collection
of individual entrepreneurs freely competing against and contracting
with one another. An association of consumers, for example, might
entice a rival baker to compete with an established one. Even if the
former baker were impoverished, Shaw says, no legal wrong oc-
curred, because it is by means of such competition that the economic
interests of all individuals are advanced." 4 A similar analysis under-
lies Shaw's view of employment contracts. Labor markets are char-
acterized by an equality of opportunity by which "every free man,
whether skilled laborer, mechanic, farmer or domestic servant, may
work or not work, or work or refuse to work with any company or
individual, at his own option, except so far as he is bound by
contract." 0 5
The primacy of contractual ordering in a competitive market
environment emphasized in Hunt has an obvious affinity with the
rise of "legal formalism" occurring in the mid-nineteenth century.
By that time, judicial reasoning was no longer primarily an instru-
ment of policy, but had become "an intellectual system which gave
common law rules the appearance of being self-contained, apolitical,
and inexorable, and which, by making 'legal reasoning seem like
mathematics,' conveyed 'an air . . . of. . . inevitability' about legal
decisions."20 Importantly, legal formalism demonstrated an obvious
203. See supra note 148.
204. Commonwealth v. Hunt, 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 11, 134 (1842).
205. Id. at 133.
206. M. HORWITZ, supra note 68, at 254 (quoting Holmes, Privilege, Malice and Intent,
8 HARV. L. REV. 1, 7 (1894)).
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connection with the ideology of contractualism 20 7 in a market econ-
omy. As Morton Horwitz states:
Since only the market could supply "neutral" principles of
distribution free from all "political" (that is, dangerously equali-
tarian) influences, it became the task of the law to create legal
doctrines that simply mirrored the market. Most of the basic
dichotomies in legal thought of the nineteenth century - be-
tween law and politics, law and morality, objective and subjec-
tive standards, distributional and allocational goals - arose to
establish the objective nature of the market and to neutralize
and hence defuse the political and redistributional potential of
law.20
8
Consequently, Hunt reflects the shift from an instrumentalist to a
formalist ideology of law. In that regard, Hunt was of significant
precedential value, as the evolution of subsequent judicial discourse
reveals.
In State v. Donaldson,0 9 the defendants were charged with con-
spiring to force their employers to discharge two journeymen. When
the employers refused, the defendants quit their employment until
the demand was met. Chief Justice Beasley of the New Jersey Su-
preme Court refused to quash the indictment, holding that an indict-
able offense had been charged at common law.
Beasley relied on a definition of conspiracy which was substan-
tially identical to that in Hunt. He stated that a conspiracy to effect
an end that was of an indictable nature, or one adopting means of an
indictable character, was unlawful. Although a statute in New
Jersey prohibited conspiracies that injured trade, Beasley did not
rely on that legislation. He concluded that the act of the defendants,
"if it could be said to injure trade at all, did so not proximately, but
remotely." 2110 The common law of conspiracy, however, had not been
superseded by the statute, and it provided a source of law governing
the case.
Beasley found that the unlawful conduct in the case consisted in
the defendants' attempts to dictate to the employer whom the em-
ployer should discharge. "This was an unwarrantable interference
207. For a treatment of the historical evolution of contract law and its relation to ideol-
ogy, see Feinman, Critical Approaches to Contract Law, 30 UCLA L. REV. 829 (1983).
Feinman's argument is that "contract is a device by which a dominant class imposes and
perpetuates a hierarchical capitalist economy on society. Contract law is continually refash-
ioned to meet the changing needs of the dominant class." Id. at 849.
208. M. HORWITZ, supra note 68, at 256.
209. 32 N.J.L. 151 (1867).
210. Id. at 155.
CONSPIRACY DOCTRINE
with the conduct of [the employer's] business, and it seems impossi-
ble that such acts should not be, in their usual effects, highly injuri-
ous." 21 1 The conspiracy did not constitute a harm to the community,
but burdened the exchange of labor in a free market of individual
parties. By acting together, the workers as a collective entity had
coerced their employers. Beasley described the unlawful character of
such conduct as follows:
In the natural position of things, each man acting as an
individual, there would be no coercion; if a single employe
should demand the discharge of a co-employe, the employer
would retain his freedom, for he could entertain or repel the req-
uisition without embarrassment to his concerns; but in the pres-
ence of a coalition of his employes, it would be but a waste of
time to pause to prove that, in most cases, he must submit,
under pain of often the most ruinous losses, to the conditions
imposed on his necessities.212
Thus, the concern of the law was to insure the "freedom" and
"equality" of the marketplace; workers might treat with the em-
ployer on an individual basis, but the "coercion" attendant upon a
confederacy of workers was inconsistent with an employer's "rights"
in conducting his business. The ideological thrust of Hunt was thus
adopted and extended.18
211. Id.
212. Id. at 156.
213. Consistent with Horowitz's thesis, the evolution of the common law in this specific
instance reflected a movement away from law as an explicit instrument of social policy and
toward a reliance on the consensual market ordering of labor transactions so as to provide an
objective and apolitical basis for legal rules. That view remains the foundation of the "eco-
nomic analysis" approach to the law of labor relations. See, e.g., Epstein, In Defense of the
Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947 (1984). The ideological power of the "law and
economics" movement derives from its claim to a scientific methodology for developing and
applying legal principles. Richard Posner, the foremost theorist of economic analysis, proposes
that wealth maximization should be the articulate objective of legal doctrine, that it is the
ethically and politically superior principle, and that "the common law is best explained as if
the judges were trying to maximize economic welfare." R. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUS-
TICE 4 (1981); see also id. at 88-115. The "wealth maximization" concept, however, has been
criticized as merely a reformulation of social policy-making in the guise of "science." Horwitz,
for example, observes as follows: "only the prestige of the sciences could have brought law-
and-economics such prominence during the past two decades. And I take ["Wealth Maximiza-
tion"] as a dramatic sign that the scientific pretensions of the economic analysis of the law are
rapidly crumbling." According to Horwitz, law and economics practitioners have become
"overt apologists for a grossly unequal Distribution of Wealth," and consequently, "it is only a
matter of time before they are pluralistically assigned to the class of one of the many 'ideolo-
gies' from which one may pick and choose." Horwitz, Law and Economics: Science or Polit-
ics?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 905, 905, 912 (1980). In fact, critical legal theory now rivals law and
economics as an area of academic inquiry. See Reidinger, Civil War in the Ivy, A.B.A.J., Nov.
1, 1986, at 64.
Further, as this study demonstrates, the common law was actively molded by judges to
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Regarding the legal content of Hunt, Beasley demonstrates with
striking clarity the indeterminacy of a rule of law in its application.
The facts of Donaldson and Hunt are analytically indistinguishable;
the defendants in both cases sought through pressure on the em-
ployer to exclude nonmember journeymen from employment and
thereby, to attain economic benefits. Yet Beasley asserts that the as-
sociation in Hunt was "not concentrated with a view to be exerted to
oppress any individual, and it was consequently entirely unlike the
case of men who take advantage of their position, to use the power,
by a concert of action, which such position gives them, to compel
their employer to a certain line of conduct."' 214 On that basis, the
two cases were deemed "not parallel" and subject to "entirely differ-
ent considerations. 215
Donaldson consequently illustrates that Hunt did little to vitiate
the instrumental usefulness of the criminal conspiracy doctrine for,
as previously indicated, prosecutions continued until the end of the
nineteenth century. Following Hunt, the terms of the pertinent dis-
course had been altered. As the social structure of accumulation as-
sociated with proletarianization and the factory system began to de-
cay, a succeeding phase of capitalist development gradually
emerged. That phase required a transformation of the labor process
from skilled craft work to relatively unskilled and "homogenized"
labor.216 It was associated with the advent of scientific management
as a form of organization and employment at will as a legal rule and
ideology.217 Many of the essential concepts of that legal doctrine,
such as "freedom of contract" and "equality of liberty and property"
for individuals, 218 are wholly compatible with Hunt. While Hunt did
conform to the needs of capitalism at a particular historical moment under particular condi-
tions of production. The law provided and legitimated "rights" for employers, thus establishing
a structure of employment relations that was subsequently validated through the device of a
"market." In that market, workers were prohibited from dealing from a position of collective
strength but were legally obligated to bargain from a position of individual weakness. For that
reason, it is hardly appropriate to describe the process as one involving the "economics of
justice." More accurately, it can be described as the "justice of economics."
214. State v. Donaldson, 32 N.J.L. 151, 157-58 (1867).
215. Id. at 158.
216. See D. GORDON, R. EDWARDS & M. REICH, supra note 8, at 100-64.
217. See Hogler, Employment at Will and Scientific Management: The Ideology of
Workplace Control, 3 HOFSTRA LABOR L.J. 27 (1985).
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While, as already suggested, the rights of liberty and property guaranteed
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such reasonable restraints as the common good or the general welfare may re-
quire, it is not within the functions of government - at least in the absence of
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not produce a new legal rule governing conspiracy prosecutions, it
did anticipate a new realm of discourse in the legal relations between
labor and capital. In that sense, it was an eminently successful judi-
cial opinion.
VII. Conclusion
The criminal conspiracy doctrine can only be fully compre-
hended in its precise historical and economic context. As a legal rule,
its economic utility was class-biased. The ideological thrust of the
law, however, was even greater in impact than its instrumental coer-
cion; legal ideology significantly furthered the creation of a working
class and its acclimation to capitalist discipline and justified the con-
sequences in the name of the communal good. Hunt did not reflect a
modification in the law so much as a change in the economic circum-
stances that shaped the common law. Shaw conceded a point of
slight significance - the innocence of the particular defendants in
one case - and introduced a new image of the relationship between
labor and capital, one based on the existence of a marketplace com-
posed of atomistic individuals. Certainly Hunt was not a betrayal of
the interests of capitalism. Critical analysis reveals, to the contrary,
that Shaw brilliantly furthered those interests in the guise of judicial
acumen.
ness and against his will to accept or retain the personal services of another, or
to compel any person, against his will, to perform personal services for another.
The right of a person to sell his labor upon such terms as he deems proper is, in
its essence, the same as the right of the purchaser of labor to prescribe the con-
ditions upon which he will accept such labor from the person offering to sell it.
Id. at 174.

